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[12255]

THE HUSTON

PLA...~

Facts

A.

On June 5, 1970, the President
Director

J. Edgar Hoover,

Donald Bennett,
Central

National

Intelligence

Defense

Also present

and Presidential

Staff Assistant

The President

ligence operations

on whether

being hampered

appointed

cooperation
tions.

entitled

(Ad Hoc)"

and

The

for their recomservices were

gathering

methods.

of the Directors

Bennett,

Admiral

Agencies,

that

Gayler,

Chairman

The
and

needs and

and to make recommenda-

and Huston

served as \'[hite

(Book VII, Part 1, p. 22)

On June 25, 1970 this ad hoc committee
report,

intel-

level of_bombings

to study intelligence

among the Intelligence

House liaison.

domestic

(Book VII, Part 1, p. 378)

General

Hoover was designated

(Book VII, Part 1,

intelligence

that it was the opinion

to be an ad hoc committee

John Ehrlichman,

Agency Directors

on intelligence

and

(Book VII,

Helms.

(Book VII, Part 1, p. 22)

the government's

Hoover,

Noel Gayler,

the need for better

they were in fact being hampered.

Helms

Richard

Tom Huston.

violence.

by restraints

Huston has testified

President

Director

in light of an es ca l a t Lng

asked the Intelligence

mendations

Agency Director

were H. R. Haldeman,

discussed

other acts of domestic
President

Agency

Director

Part 1, p. 375)

p. 375)

Intelligence

Security

Agency

held a meeting with FBI

"Special

(hereafter

Report

Interagency

completed

Committee

its

on Intelligence

lISpecial Reportll).
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The first page of the Special
the title page, bore the following

Report,

immediately

following

notation:

"June 25, 1970

This report, prepared for the President,
is approved by all members of this comm i t t ee
and their signatures are affixed hereto.

lsi J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau
Chairman

of Investigation

/s/ Richard Helms
Director, Central Intelligence

Agency

/s/ Lt. General D. V. Dennett. USA
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

/s/ Vice Admiral Noel Ga"vler. USN
Director, National Securi~y A~ency

II

(Book VII, Part 1, p. 385)

Part One of the Special
Internal

Seclirity Threat,"

assessments
groUPS,

of the current

groups.

internal

of official

States intelligence

services

"Summary

threat assessment,

security

of"
including

threat of various

of communist

countries,

domestic

and of other

(Book VII, Part 1, pp. 389 - 410)

Part T\,1o,entitled
waS a discussion

entitled

was a lengthy

of the intelligence

revolutionary

Report,

"Restraints
restraints

collection

on Intelligence
under which

procedures

operated,

Collection,"

six types of United
and of the advantagas

[12257]

-3-

and disadvantages

of continuing

or lifting

(Book VII,

such restraints.

Part 1, pp. 411 - 429)
Part Three,
assessed

thed~gree

and recommended

entitled .IIEvaluation of Interagency

of coordination

means toiw~rove

Although
the alternative

that the FBI objected

listed,

to lifting

those on legal mail coverage

Agency

it.

the Special Report

decisions

of communications

between

addressed

communications

Coordination,"

the Intelligence

Agencies

(Book VII, Part 1, pp. 430 - 431)
took no position

it included

with respect to

statements

the restraints

in footnotes

discussed,

except

(keeping a record of the return address
to an individual)

and National

Security

(Book VII, Part 1, pp. 416,

intelligence.

419, 421, 424, and 427)
During
Report,

together Hith a memorandum

Intelligence
mended

the first week of July, 1970, Huston

Collection,"

that most, although

restraints
Huston's

on intelligence
recommendations

"Electronic

entitled

to Haldeman.

"Operational

In the memorandum

not all, of the present
collection
included

Surveillances

sent the Special

activities

Restraints
Huston

procedures

On

recom-

imposing

should be changed.

the folloving:

and Penetrations.

Recommendation:
Present procedures should be changed to permit
intensification
of coverage of individuals and groups
in the United States vho pose a major threat to the
internal security.
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.••

Mail

Coverage.

Recommendation:
Restrictions

on legal

coverage

should

be removed.

ALSO, present restrictions
on covert coverage
be relaxed on selected targets of priority foreign
intelligence
and internal security interest.

should

Rationale:
....
Covert coverage is illegal and
there are serious risks involved.
However, the advantages
to be derived from its use outweigh the risks.
This
technique is particularly
valuable in identifying
espionage agents and other contacts of foreign intelligence services.
Surreptitious

Entry.

Recommendation:
Present restrictions
should be modified to permit
orocurement
of vitally nepned Foreign cryptographic
material.
ALSO, present restrictions
should be modified to
permit selective use of this technique ogainst other
urgent and high priority internal security targets.
Rationale:
Use of this technique is clearly illegal:
it
amounts to burglary.
It is also highly risky and
could result in great embarrassment
if exposed.
However, it is also the most fruitful tool and can
produce the type of· intelligence wh i.ch cannot be
obtained in any other fashion.
The FBI, in Mr. Hoover's younger days, used to
conduct such o~erations with great success and with
no exposure.
The infornation
secured was invaluable."
(Book VII, Part
On July

14, 1970,

"The recommendations
been

approved

1, pp. 438 - 440)
I-ialdeman sent

you have proposed

by the President.

a memorandum

as a result

. . . The formal

to Huston

stating,

of the rev Lew have

official

memorandum
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should,
which

of course,

to carry

be prepared

it out."

On July
titled

Intelligence"

Agencies,

the President.

informing

received

after

FBI Director

been

upset

very

talked
t-n haHo

part

tho

Part

Hitchell,
contained

received

General

had

the Attorney
Huston

was

President
and

after

received

July

rhe

of the four

approved

of July

by

joined

indicating

call from

that Hoover

and that Hoover
General

m~morandum

with

23, 1970 had

a telephone

in the memorandum

either

reversed.

Hoover

had

to undertake

27, 1970, Director

his

telephone

a call from Haldeman

talked

to the President,

General
instructed

desired

the Attorney

discuss

memorandum

memorandum,

in

who

en-

steps

(Bonk VTr,

Hoover

in opposing

of July

had

23, 1970.

met with
the
(Book

1, p. 463)
Shortly

Huston

memorandum"

1, p. 454)

to the Attorney

On or before

General

recommendations
VII,

to talk

a "decision

Sullivan

de cLs 'ons reflected

1, p. 470)

Attor~ey

William

by

1, p , 447)

them of the options

Huston

by the decision

or intended

sent

the decision

by Mr. Hoover,

Assistant

Part

be the device

to each ,of the Directors

(Book VII, Part

Shortly
been

(Book VII,

23, 1970 Huston

"Domestic

Intelligence

and that should

an~ then

to reconsider

the matter.

indicating

would

or that Haldeman

(Book VII,

the decision
the matter,
have
Part

with

Sullivan,

that the Attorney

to the President,

to recall

General

conversation

but

had
that,

memorandum;

talked

in any event,
that the

and that Haldeman,

a meeting

in the near

to

Hoover,

future

to

1, p. 470)
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Huston

arranged

White House Situation

for the recall of the document

Room.

the decision memorandum

(Book VII, Part 1, p. 470)

on "Domestic

each of the four Intelligence
on or about July 28, 1970.
Huston

continued

Agencies

of his recommendations

for lifting

activities

operational

Room

Although
(Book VII,

restraints. on

were not reinstituted.

1/

Discussion.

B.

1.

With respect

tions, the Special
President
national

Report

historically
security.

to electronic

surveillances

of the Interagency

has had the authority

In addition,

Committee

and penetrastated,

to act in matters

Title III of the Omnibus

and Safe Streets Act of 1968 provides

1/

were returned by

to the White House Situation

to press for adoption

collection

the

Copies of

(Book VII, Part 1, pp. 472, 474)

Part 1, pp. 480-85), the plans
intelligence

Intelligence"

through

a statutory

basis."

"The
of

Crime Control
(Book VII,

In or before December, 1970, when John Dean had assumed responsibility for matters of domestic intelligence for internal ~ecurity
purposes, an Intelligence Evaluation Committee 'vas created to
improve coordination among the intelligence community and to prepare evaluations and estimates of domestic intelligence.
(Book
VII, Part 1, pp. 487, 497) This step may be seen as an outgrowth
of the reconm1endations in Part Three of the Special Report,
entitled "Evaluation of Interagency Coordination."
(Book VII,
Part 1, pp. 430-31)
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Part

1, p. 415)

coverage

was

The Special

(Book VII,

legal.

collection

activities,

to present

political
However,

surreptitious

Part

with

entry,

as approval

The

Special

sisting

of intelligence

ligence

Agencies.

listed

as options

categories
made

by Huston

verbatim

Although

from

among

Committee.

The Special

Agencies,

consisting
and their

approval

mi~lt

indicate

that

have

may

Report

was

were

been

by Haldeman

the options

listed

affixed

were

agencies.

con-

it
on all

The recommendations

memorandum

options

are taken

Report
listed

by all members

of the
by the

of the

of the four Intelligence

signatures
taken

be viewed

of the four Intel-

by the Special

approved

of

by a committee

activities.

of the Directors

approval

of restrictions

go beyond

stated

(Book VII,

illegal.

recommendations,

Restraints"

they do not

Report

by Huston

by government

from each

listed

and

Special

consequently

or removal

the options

Con®ittee;

were

prepared

collection

appeared

coverage

prepared

it did not make

in the "Operational

Interagency

Committee,

areas

was

the relaxation

mail

The President's

actions

Report

intelligence

sources,

Committee's

activities

professionals

of intelligence

covert

memorandum

of othen.,ise illegal

2.

of campus

the Interagency

in these

Other

mail

questions.

to both

439 and 440)

that routine

1, p. 417)

than legal

collection

recommendations

stated

as .development

Restraints"

418, 420,

also

Part

respect

both

intelligence

1, pp.

Huston's

such
rather

and the "Operational
that such

Report

not

to the first

page.

or by the President
regarded

as improper

This
to
by
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the professional
footnoted

United

objections

States intelligence

of Mr. Hoover

community,

contained

despite

the

in the body of Part T"70

of the Special Report.

3.
gathering
intended

The options

activities,

of lifting

listed

of bombings

Report.

of the threat assessment

Part One stated

a capability

that communist

for actively

fomenting

domestic

The recommendations
"Operational

are cast in general
(electronic

have depended

5.

entry).

decision

or "relaxed"

unrest,

indications

contained

although
that

in the memo-

on Intelligence
procedures

restraints

approval

Collection"

should be changed"

(mail coverage),

(Book VII, Part 1, pp. 438-39)

The President's

or "modified"
Much might

might have been implemented.

in principle

of modifying

which had been in existence

,vithin five days after the circulation

memorandum,

conunendations.

Restraints

upon how the modifications

some operational
"as withdralm

by Huston

terms, e.g., "present

surveillance),

(surreptitious

services

(Book VII, Part 1, p. 402)

this had yet occurred.

randum entitled

number

(Book VII,

intelligence

it :::l~~st::.tedthat there had been no suhstantial

4.

contained

There had been a substantial

and riots in the spring and summer of 1970.

Part 1, p. 377)
possessed

on intelligence

in Part Two of the Special Report, were

to be taken in the context

in Part One of the Special

restraints

which was the device

of Huston's

for carrying

(Book V1I, .Part 1, pp. 447, 472, 474)

since 1966

out the reThere is no
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evidence

before

~eptitious

the Committee

that any illegal mail coverage,

entry, or electronic

undertaken,

surveillance

or penetration

during these five days, under the authority

sur-

was ever

of the

decision memorandum.
6.
operation

It has occasionally

of the "Plumbers"

was not actually
were handled

rescinded.

by entirely

group is evidence

different

was directed was, essentially,
rnnrprned

It strains

and

that the Huston Plan

This is untenable.

and they arose a year apart.

werp

been urged that the formation

The two matters

groups of White House staff members

The problem
domestic

to which

violence,

the Huston Plan
whereas

the "Plumbers"

with news leaks and the theft of the Pentagon

the facts to find any connection

Papers.

bet,veen the two.

[12264]
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KLEINDIENST CONFIRMATION HEARINGS

A.

Facts*

On

February 15, 1972, the President nominated Deputy

Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst to be Attorney General of the
United States to succeed John N. Mitchell, who was leaving the Department of Justice to campaign for the re-election of the President.
The Senate Committee on the Judi~iary held brief hearings on the
nomination and quickly voted to recommend that 'the nomination be
confirmed.

(HJC, Statement of Information, Book V, Part 1, 605.

Hereinafter cited by book, part and page number.)
On February 29, 1972, Jack Anderson, a newspaper columnist,
published the first of three articles alleging that three antitrust
cases, commenced by the Department of Justice in 1969, had been
settled favorably to the defendant, the International Telephone &
Telegraph Corporation (ITT), in 1971 in return for a large financial

The Committee's investigation of the ITT case was originally
focused on allegations that the Administration and the President
had settled the three ITT antitrust cases in exchange for an ITT
pledge of financial support for the 19)2 Republican National'
Convention. Howeve r , during the course of the Staff's investigation the focus shifted to Presidential involvement in the 1972
Kleindienst Confirmation Hearings. The Special Prosecutor has
also concluded that no impropriety existed during the 1971 period
but is investigating possible offenses in connection with the
1972 hearings. Thus there will be no discussion herein of the
1971 events except as they specifically relate to the testimony
of the witnesses during the 1972 hearings.

[12266]
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contribution to the 1972 Republican National Convention in San Diego.
Kleindienst immediately asked that the Senate Judiciary Hearings be
reconvened in order that he might answer these allegations.

(Book

V, Part 2, 633)
On March 2, 1972, pursuant to Kleindienst's request, the
hearings reconvened.

The purpose of the hearings was to determine

what connection, if any, existed between the settlement of the ITT
antitrust cases and the ITT convention contributions.

In connection

with the investigation, the Senate Committee ortthe Judiciary inquired
into several areas including:

(1) the extent of involvement of the

White House in the filing, handling and settling of the ITT antitrust
cases; (2) the circumstances under which the ITT convention pledge
was obtained; and (3) the actions of the Department of Justice personnel in the ITT antitrust cases.

Several of the \vitnesses before

the Committee were questioned specifically in regard to those areas.
(Book V, Part 2, 677-904., passim)
Richard Kleindienst testified that he had never been interfered with by anyone at the \~ite House in the exercise of his responsibilities in the ITT antitrust cases.
755-58, 849-53)

(Book V, Part 2, 677-80, 729-34,

That testimony was untrue, in that on April 19, 1971,

the day before an appeal was due to be filed in the Supreme Court in
the ITT-Grinnell case, the President telephoned Kleindienst and
ordered that the appeal not be filed.

(Book V, Part 1, 311)

Further,

in his Senate testimony, Kleindienst described the circumstances of

[12267]
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the decision to delay this appeal without mentioning the President's
phone call.

(Book V, Part 2, 729-34,

On May 16, 1974 Kleindienst

751-54)
pleaded guilty to an information

charging a failure to answer accurately and fully questions pertinent
to the Senate Judiciary Committee's inquiry, in violation of 2 U.S.C.
§192.

(Book V, Part 2, 965)
John N. Mitchell testified in part as to his involvement in

the handling of the ITT antitrust cases.
had recused himself in the ITT cases.

Mitchell testified that he

(Book V, Part 2, 771)

In fact,

Mitchell had been involved in contacts with ITT officials concerning
the cases during 1970 and had various discussions with White House
staff members about the ITT antitrust cases.

(Book V, Part 1, 143)

In his Senate testimony, Mitchell denied that he had ever discussed
the ITT antitrust cases with the President, although he had specifically
discussed the ITT-Grinnell appeal with the President on April 21, 1971,
two days after the President's order to Kleindienst.
371-76; Part 2, 771-75)

(Book V, Part 1,

In that discussion Mitchell had persuaded

the President not to interfere with the appeal of ITT-Grinnell to the
- Supreme Court.

(Book V, Part 1, 371)

Evidence Relating to Presidential Involvement
Whatever evidence of Presidential

involvement in and

knowledge of the events of the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings in
March and April, 1972 may exist is entirely circumstantial.
The President returned from China on the evening of February
28, 1972.

After spending a few days in Key Biscayne the President

[12268]
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began his first full day in the White House on Monday, March 6.
V, Part 1, 141-42)

(Book

Four days earlier, on the evening of March 2,

several politically embarrassing documents had been delivered by an
ITT representative to a White House aide, Wallace Johnson, who in
turn gave them to John Mitchell and Charles Colson.
681)

(Book V, Part 2,

Three days earlier, on March 3, Richard Kleindienst had

testified about the circumstances surrounding the delay of the appeal
of the ITT-Grinnell case a year earlier.

(Book V, Part 2, 729-34)

On Monday, March 6, the President met, and talked by telephone,
1/
with three of his top aides, Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Colson.After
a noon-hour meeting with the President, John Ehrlichman met with SEC
Chairman Casey, apparently in an attempt to shortcut an SEC subpoena
of the politically sensitive documents that had been delivered by ITT
to the White House on March 2.

(Book V, Part 2, 735)

Also on March

6, Richard Kleindienst's diary reflects the fact that he was at the
White House for a Cabinet meeting with the President.

(Richard

Kleindienst diar~ submitted to the Inquiry staff after the initial
presentation to the Committee of information regarding the ITT matter.)
The next day Kleindienst in a detailed statement to the Senate Committee
described the events of April 19, 1971 without mentioning the President's order to him not to file the ITT-Grinnell appeal.

(Book V,

Part 2, 751)

}j

On June 24, 1974 the Committee issued a subpoena to the President
for tapes, dictabe1ts, memoranda and other records of these meetings
and conversations. Such materials, if they exist, have not yet
been furnished to the Con~ittee.
[12269]
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On

March 14, 1972, John Mitchell appeared before the Senate

Judiciary Committee and twice testified that there had been no communications between the President and him with respect to the ITT antitrust

1/
litigation or any other antitrust litigation.-

That evening the

President and Mr. Mitchell had their only telephone conversation
during March of which the Committee staff is aware.
771)

(Book V, Part 2,

Mr. Mitchell has denied in an unsworn interview with the Inquiry

staff that he discussed his testimony, or the testimony of any other
witness before the Senate Committee with the President, with Mr.
Kleindienst, or with any members of the President's staff.
According to Charles Colson's calendar, he spent the morning
of March 18, 1972 on "ITT" matters.

He had three telephone conversa-

tions with Mr. Mitchell during the morning.

In his interview with

the staff Mr. Mitchell did not recall any conversations with Colson.
'!:_/
That afternoon the President and Colson met for over two hours.
On March 24, 1972, the President held his only press conference of this period.

He said that:

as far as the [Senate Judiciary Committee]
hearings are concerned, there is nothing that has
happened in the hearings to date that has in one

1/

On

'!:_/

On June 24, 1972 the Committee issued a subpoena to the President
for tapes, dictabelts, memoranda, and other records of that meeting.
Such materials, if they exist, have not yet been furnished to the
Committee.

June 24, 1972, the Committee issued a subpoena to the President
for tapes, dictabelts, memoranda, and other records of that conversation. Such materials, if they exist, have not yet been furnished
to the Committee.

[12270]
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way shaken my confidence in Nr. Kleindienst as an
able, honest man, fully qualified to be Attorney
General of the United States.

In this press conference, the President also said that, "We moved on
[ITT].

We moved on it effectively •.•

proud of that record •..

Mr. McLaren is justifiably very

[and he] should be."

He said that Admin-

istration action had prevented ITT from groving further and quoted
Solicitor General Griswold as to the excellence of the ITT settlement.
(Book V, Part 2, 799)
Charles Colson testified before ,the Committee as to a meeting
during this time period that he attended with the President and
Haldeman.

Colson testified that the President recalled that he had

made a telephone call to Kleindienst:

Mr. Colson. I recall one instance when the President
was basically talking to Haldeman, but I was in the
room and obviously the question of his involvement in
the ITT Settlement had somehow come up.
Mr. Jenner.

When you say his you are referring to who?

Mr. Colson.

The President.

Mr. Jenner.

All right.

Mr. Colson. Because he said do you, he said to Haldeman,
he said do you remember the time I called Kleindienst
and got very agitated or very excited with Dick and did
I discuss the ITT case or was I talking about policy.
And Bob said no you we re talking about policy, you
weren't discussing the case.
And the President said are you sure?
And Haldeman said yes, either I 'vas there wh LLe you
called or Ehrlichman was there and heard your call and
the President said, thank God I :didn't discuss the case.

[12271]
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Mr. Jenner. Do you have a recollection with better
certainty that this conversation you have now described
took place during the span of the ITT-Kleindienst
hearings.
Mr. Colson. Yes, I think it did. I can't imagine
why it would come up at another time. I think it
must have -- I know it is the first time I ever knew
the President talked to Kleindienst about this matter
at all. And I don't think I learned about it until
late in the month and I remember learning about Lt; in
that fashion, that the President was trying to recall
what he had said to Kleindienst.
(Charles Colson
testimony, House Judiciary Comn1ittee (HJC), T.434l43)

1:./

Colson also testified that on March 27 and 28, 1972 he and
Clark MacGregor met with the President and presented to him the
reasons why' they felt the nomination of Kleindienst should be with'l:_/
Colson testified that he left that meeting feeling that
drawn.
the President was inclined to agree that the nomination should be
withdravm.

(Colson testimony, HJC, T 43l14-46)
On March 29, Colson and MacGregor met with H. R. Haldeman

who informed them that the President was going to meet with Kleindienst
that afternoon to determine whether or not Kleindienst would withdraw
his name from consideration.

(Colson testimony, HJC, T 4346-47)

Colson also testified that on the mOTI1ing,of March 30, he and MacGregor
met with Haldeman who described the President's meeting with Kleindienst

Citations to testimony are to the typewritten transcripts; at this
writing printed transcripts are not yet available.
'l:_/

Tapes of that meeting have neither been requested nor subpoenaed
by the Committee, because the Staff was unaware of their relevance
until Colson's testimony ",as received.

[12272]
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in which Kleindienst convinced the President that the nomination
should not be withdrawn.

(Colson testimony, HJC, T 4348-51)

However,

in an unsworn interview with the staff, Kleindienst stated that he had no
contact with anyone at the White House during March, April and May
of 1972.
Colson took notes of his meeting with Haldeman and MacGregor
(Exhibit 22 to Charles Colson testimony, HJC, T 4349) and later
returned to his office to dictate a memorandum to Haldeman that
argued that the nomination should be withdrawn.
HJC, T 4352)

(Colson testimony,

His reasons included the fact that he had reviewed

documents that would tend to contradict Mitchell's testimony to the
Senate Committee.

(Book V, Part 2, pp. 805-09)

Later that day Colson

met w Lt h the President· and'informed him that he had written such a

})
memorandum.

After meeting with the President, Colson sent the

memorandum to H. R. Haldeman.

Colson testified that by normal practice

the memorandum would be given by Mr. Haldeman to the President.
(Colson testimony, HJC, T 4356-57)
Mr. Mitchell has told the Inquiry staff that, near the end
.of March, he recalls generally that he conveyed to the President,
either directly, or through Mr. Haldeman, his view that the Kleindienst

!/

On June 24, 1974, the Committee issued a subpoena to the President
for tapes, dictabelts, memoranda and other records of meetings and
conversations on March 30,1972, b etween the President and Haldeman,
Ehrlichman, Colson or any of them. Such materials, if they exist,
have not yet been furnished to the Conunittee.

[12273]
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nomination

should not be withdrawn

but that he recalls

no specific

conversations.
On April

4, 1972 the President

and talked once by telephone
President
things,
edited

with Colson.

met with Haldeman
changing

transcript

met four times with Haldeman

and Mitchell

the convention

During

the afternoon

and discussed,

among other

site from San Diego to Miami.

of this conversation

the

has been supplied

1/

An

to the Com-

'!:_/
mittee.

This edited

tial knowledge

transcrip~

of the testimony

shows that there was very little

indicates

of Kleindienst
discussion

On June 8, 1972, Kleindienst
On June 12, 1972, Kleindienst
Attorney

General,

attended

by the President.
During

pending before
the hearings,

no evidence

or Mitchell,

of the

at the ~1ite House

(Book V, Part 2, 901)

the period

the debates

by the Senate.

to the Office

and was sworn in at a ceremony

the Senate,

and indeed

of the hearings.

was confirmed

was appointed

of Presiden-

that the Kleindienst
the press provided

and the final vote.

nomination

extensive

was

coverage

of

(Book V, Part 2, 855)

On June 24, 1974 the Committee issued a subpoena to the President
for tapes, dictabelts, memoranda and other records of all but the
last meeting.
Such materials, if they exist, have not yet been
furnished to the Committee.
On May 15, 1974, the Committee subpoenaed the tape and other materials relating to the April 4
meeting between the President, Haldeman and Mi tchell.

'!:_/

The President has invited the Chairman and ranking member to
verify that this transcript accurately reflects the discussion.
To this date this invitation has not been accepted.

[12274]
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This press coverage was reflected

in the news summaries

daily by the White House staff for the President.
On January
Secretary
Decision",

but admitted

role in the ITT antitrust
denied that the

in the ITT settlement

was made in exchange
the telephone

"The ITT Antitrust

The White Paper

had any involvement

the settlement

entitled,

the President's

cases and their settlement.
President

1/

8, 1974 the Office of the \lliiteHouse Press

issued a "White Paper"
describing

prepared

and denied that

for an ITT convention

call to Kleindienst.

pledge,

(Book V, Part 2,

956)

1/

On June 24, 197!+, the Committee issued a subpoena for the
President's copies of the news summaries compiled during the
period February 22, 1972 through June 2, 1972, inclusive.
On
July 12, 1974, the President's Special Counsel responded by
letter to the subpoena and in part agreed to furnish the Conunittee
copies of summaries which were actually presented to the President.
Mr. St. Clair has informed the Committee that the news summaries
show no notation by the President on those portions dealing
with
the ITT/Kleindienst Hearings, and offered to allow the Chairman
and Ranking Ninority Nember to examine the summaries to verify
that fact. To date that invitation has not been accepted.

[12275]
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B.

Theories

1.

of the Evidence

Summary of Information:

The Summary
duty to transmit
testimony

of Information

information

argues

to hold office.

power to advise and consent

case is included

by appointing

safeguard

which

under the general

Summary of Information

also argues

the nominee

Applicable

has a

the nominee's

The theory behind this

of Senate confirmation

permitted
is untrue,

category

the Senate to act on
even in part.

As this

of abuse of power, the

that a President

after his confirmation

Criminal

Title 18 U.S.C.

considering

to the nomination.

if the President

the basis of any information

that a President

This duty rests on the Senate's

duty is that the constitutional
could be frustrated

Theory

to the Senate about his nominee's

given to a Senate Con~ittee

qualification

2.

Constitutional

abuses his power

has been tainted.

Law

§4, entitled

"Misprision

of Felony."

provides:
v.Jhoever,having knmvledge of the actual commission
of a felony cognizable by a court of the United
States conceals and does not as soon as possible
make known the same to some judge or other person
in civil or military authority under the United
States, shall be fined not more than $500 or
imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

3.

Questions

of Fact

tfuatever view of the evidence
questions

of fact must be answered

of the President

is taken, certain

before ~rongful

conduct

preliminary
on the part

may be established.
[12276]
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(a) Has the Testimony of Kleindienst and Mitchell perjury?

In the course of their testimony before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, Kleindienst and Mitchell appear to have
given incorrect or misleading testimony several times. Kleindienst
apparently misled the Committee about the nature of his contacts
with the Hhite House in the filing, handling and settlement of the
,

ITT antitrust cases.

.

Mitchell apparently misled the Committee about

his contact with the Hhite House and with ITT officials regarding
the ITT cases, and he further was evasive about his involvement in
the Administration's decision to select Sa~ Diego as the site of the
1972 Republican National Convention.

Certain statements by Kleindienst

and Mitchell appear to be clearly incorrect.

On March 7, 1972, Kleindienst

described the reasons for the decision to delay the ITT-Grinnell
appeal on April 19, 1971, without mentioning the President's telephone
call of that day in which the President ordered the appeal to
be dropped.

On Harch 14, 1972, Mitchell stated that he never discussed

the ITT antitrust cases with the President, whereas actually he had
discussed the appeal with the President on April 21, 1971.

1:./

A factual issue may be raised as to the intent of Kleindienst
and Mitchell in these misstatements.

In his interview with the Inquiry staff,

for example, Hr. Nitchell indicated that what he meant when he denied
talking to the President about the ITT cases, was that he had never
talked to the President about the merits of those cases.
1/

To date, neither Kleindienst nor Hitchell has been prosecuted
for perjury in connection with the ITT hearings. Kleindienst
has pleaded to the lesser offense of failure to fully respond
under 2 U.S.C. §192. Hitchell has not been prosecuted for
any act relating to the ITT/Kleindienst hearings.
[12277]

-13-

The question to which Mr. Kleindienst directed his attention
and misstatements, by way of contrast, was specifically why the ITTGrinnell appeal to the Supreme Court in April 1971 was delayed.

However,

the misstatements of Kleindienst may be subject to the defense of
"literal truth.1t
theCowuittee

The lengthy statement which Kleindienst read to

on March 7, 1972, omitting any mention of the President's

telephone call, may be misleading but not in fact false.

Kleindienst's

statement related only actual events of April 19 minus the telephone
c&ll, and therefore it may be literally true but incomplete.

Under

the recent decision in Branston v~ United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973),
in which the Court held that testimony that is literally true but
arguably misleading by negative implication is not perjury, it could
be argued that Kleindienst's remarks on March 7 did not constitute
perjury.
It is also possible that the misstatements were not perjury
because they were not material.

The test of materiality is simply

whether the testimony has a natural effect or tendency to influence,
impede or dissuade the investigative body from pursuing its investigation.

United States v. Morgan, 1%

~enied, 343 U. S. 965 (1952).

F. 2d 623 (2d Cir. 1952), cert.

The Senate Committee on the Judiciary

was charged w i.t h evaluating the qualificatiDns of Richard Kleindienst
to be Attorney General.

In the exercise of this constitutional

responsibility the Senate Committee 'vas investigating the connection
between the ITT antitrust cases and the ITT convention pledge.

The

fact that the President had intervened in the handling of the ITT cases
might have been of substantial interest to the Comm i t t ee , if only
because it specifically involved the norlinee before the Committee and
his predecessor in office.

[12278]
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On the other hand, it may be argued that the Senate Committee's
investigation
settlement

into the ITT scandal was focused properly

of the ITT cases and the reasons

that a misstatement
Committee's
disclosure

for the settlement,

about the .appeal would not be material

inquiry.

It may be questioned,

of the President's

and the latter's

only on the

successful

telephone
resistance,

impact upon the Committee's

judgment

furthermore,

so

to the

whether

call to Kleindienst,
would have had any adverse

as to Mr. Kleindienst's

qualifi-

cations.

(b)

Did the President have kno\.;r1edgeof the testimony
Kleindienst and Mitchell?

Evidence Supporting
Testimony
The evidence

of Presidential

fact that the testimony
extensively
President
of March
President

reported

in the press and broadcast
conversation

14, the day of Mitchell's
in his March

familiar with the hearings
Colson has testified
that the President
on the afternoon

testimony.

24

informed

the hearings
media.

was

Second,

the

on the evening

testimony.

Third,

the

that he was

of the witnesses.

Fourth,

him on Harch 29 and 30

to, and did in fact, meet with Kleindienst

29.

It coul~ be inferred

learned of and discussed

Fifth, Charles

comes. first from the

press conference

and the testimony

intended

Knowledge. of

with Mitchell

perjured

that Ea1deman

of Harch

that the President

knowledge

of the \vitnesses before

had a telephone

indicated

Presidential

of

Colson's

from this meeting

Kleindienst's

misleading

Narch 30 memo randum to I'a Lderaan

[12279]
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cites certain documents in White House files that contradicted
Mitchellts testimony and tended to show that the President was
involved in the ITT case in 1971.

If the President read this memorandum,

he might have realized that evidence existed that contradicted the
testimony of Mitchell before the Committee.
Evidence Negating Presidential Knowledge of TestimonL

First, no direct evidence of actual Presidential knowledge
exists.

Except for the President's general statement in his press

conference of March 24, the evidence is entirely inferential.

Second,

Kleindienst's testimony concerning the appeal was not generally
reported in the press.

The focus of the news media was on the

allegations concerning the settlement of the ITT cases, not the
appeal of the ITT-Grinnell case.

It is, therefore, unlikely

that the President learned of Kleindienst's perjury by way of
the media.

Third; the press conference of March 24 does not indicate

specific knowledge of the actual testimony of either Kleindienst or
Mitchell.

Charles Colson and other witnesses have informed the staff

that the President does not prepare for news briefings by studying
primary news sources,
by his staff.

Instead he utilizes a briefing book prepared

There is no evidence before the Corunittee as to what

the briefing book for the President's Harch 24 press conference
contained.

Nor has the Comnlittee requested this briefing book;

Fourth,

although H. R. Haldeman may have told Charles Colson that Kleindienst
and the President me t on the afternoon of Harch 29, Kleindienst has

[12280]
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specifically denied this to the staff.

Kleindienst also said that

he had had no conversations with anyone at the White House during
March, April and May of 1972.

Fifth, although Colson's memo of

March 30 does indicate that documents contradicted Mitchell's
testimony, Charles Colson testified that he does not know whether
the President received or read the m~no.

In addition, Colson has

testified to the Conmittee that he never discussed either his memo,
the documents described therein, or the testimony of Mitchell or
Kleindienst with the President.

Nor did the President ever indicate

to Colson any awareness that Kleindienst had not told the truth to
the Senate Committee.

(Colson testimony, HJC,. T. 4369)

(c) Did the President know or believe that the testimony of
Kleindienst and Mitchell was false?

The issue of whether the President would have known the
testimony of Kleindienst and Mitchell wa s false depends on whether
the President would have correctly recollected his contact with the
two about,the ITT~Grinnell

appeal in April 1971, ten and one-half

months earlier.

Evidence Supporting Presidential Recollection
Events

of 1971

The President was in fact a participant in the events of
April 19 and 21, 1971.

The Summary of Information submitted to the

COlnmittee suggests that the strident tone of the telephone call
to Kleindienst, and the fact that the President's conversation on
April 21, 1971 caused him to rescind his order to drop the ITT-Grinnell

[12281]
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appeal, make it seem likely that the President
(Summary of Information
addition,
meeting

re Kleindienst

Charles Colson has testified
in which

the President

call to Kleindienst

Evidence

Negating

discussion

that the President,

Appointment-ITT,

p. 8)

that he was present

recalled

In

at a

that he had made a phone

and "blew up at him."

The Kleindienst
Mitchell

had such knowledge.

Presidential

Recollection

of 1971 Events

call lasted no more than three minutes;

less than five.
in 19721

The

conclusion

after the passage

filled with events of the order of importance

the

is hardly compelled

of ten and a half months
of his trip to China, would

advert to and recall the conversations.
Moreover,
the President
call.

the evidence

inaccurately

Colson testified

supports

recalled

the conclusion

the substance

that the President

that in fact

of that telephone

was assured by Haldeman

that the call was not about the ITT case but rather was about the
antitrust
responded,

policies
" ...

of McLaren.

According

to Colson,

thank God, I didn't discuss

the President

the case."

[12282]
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4.

Constitutional Theory:
Interference "'ith Power of Advice
Consent; Abuse of Power of AUDointment

The Summary
nominations

the President

record.

As authority

Iredell

relating

Carolina

of Information

Ratifying

contends

that in connection

has a duty to come forward

for this proposition,

to the treaty-making
Convention,

and

and correct

the arguments

process,

with
the

of James

made in the No r t h

are cited:

[The President] must certainly be punishable for glvlng
false information to the Senate.
He is to regulate all
intercourse with foreign powers, and it is his duty to
impart to the Senate eve~y material intelligence he
receives.
If it should appear that he has not given
them full information, but has concealed important intelligence which he ought to have communicated, and by
that means induced them to enter into measures injurious
to their country, and which they would not have consented
to had the true state of things been disclosed to them,
,-~ in this case, I ask whe t he r upon an impeachment for
a misdemeanor upon such an account, the Senate would
probably favor him. 1/
However,
where

Iredell's remarks were directed

to the

t rea.ty-rnakIng

process,

the Senate has a larger role than it does in the appointr:lent

process.

In advising

and consenting

to treaties,

the Senate has a

role nearly

co-vext ens Ive with that of the President.

the Framers

was that the President

The intent of

wou Ld meet wf.t h the Senate and

.?_/
consult

on treaty projects.

Consequently,

the Senate has conferred

<,

l/

4 Elliot

127.

3/

Pierce Butler, a member of the Constitutional
Conv~ntion~ is quoted
as f o Llows : "Treaties to be gone over clause by clause, by the President
and Senate together • • . •II cited in John Adams' I<lritings (ed , C. F.
Adams, 1851), III, p. 409. See Haynes, George F., 'i'heSenate of the
UniteG StatE.S - Its History ~d Practice, (Hough t on Nifflin Co ,, Doston,
1933)

[12283]
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with the President
preliminary
negotiations

throughout

negotiations

all stages of the treaty process

with foreign powers through

caused by reason of Senate amendments

- from

supplementary

to treaties

sub-

1:.1
mitted

for ratification.
With respect

way of contrast,
the President

to confirmation

substantive

of nominees

consultation

has been the exception

between

for office, by
the Senate and

rather than the rule:

In the early history of the country several connnittees
of the Senate sought to confer with the President
concerning his nominations.
Both John Adams and
James Madison sent a message to the Senate maintaining
that it was contrary to the Constitution.
Thereafter
no further attempt was made by a Senate connnittee to
confer formally with the President about a nomination,
though informal consultations be tween the President
and members of Congress are common and it has never
been contended that they are in any way improper.
Requests for information about nominees are usually
made to the d.epartment s concerned, and ordinarily
such information is supplied.
Presidents, however,
have consistently asserted the right to withhold
confidential information.
II

11 Eleven ciifferent Presidents f rom Hashington to Harding have
formally requested the Senate1s advice before entering upon proposed
negotiations.
Moreover, after submission, the President and the
Senate have negotiated amendments to treaties which were subs~quently
ratified by foreign governments.
Haynes, The Senate of the United
Statesl .~ra,
pp. 590, 608.
21 Harris, The Advice and Consent
Press, 1953),
pp. 240~4l.

of the Senate

(University

of California

[12284]
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Abuse of Power:

Need for a Standard

Whether or not a President is legally capable of committing

II
a misprision within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §4~ it is submitted
that he must have known of and concealed perjury in order to be
liable in impeachment under the facts of the Kleindienst confirmation
case.
The bureaucratic considerations in favor of delineating
the bounds of "abuse of power" in the Kleindienst context by
reference to the elements of criminal misprision are, arguably,
roughly analogous to those which gave rise to the longstanding
Federal policy in this area, namely, the avoidance of reporting
burdens.
The significant practical ramifications of holding any
President accountable for his failure to correct the record when
testimony or other information supplied to Congress by Executive
branch officers is not perjurious, but only misleading, should be
obvious.

No formulation of the "abuse of power" charge as general

as that set out in the Stmrnary of Information should be adopted by
the Committee without reflecting upon these ramifications.

II

See discussion, subsection (c), pp. 22-24, infra.
[12285]
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Hisprision of Felony

The statutory offense of misprision of felony has four
elements:
To sustain a convi.ction ...
for mispri.sion of
felony it (is] incumbent upon the government to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt
~l) That . . . the principal hau committed and
completed the felony alleged prior to (the date
of the alleged misprision];
(2) That the defendant nad full knowledge of that
fact;
(3) That he failed to notify the authorities; and
(4) That he took (an] affirmative step to conceal
the crime of the principal. 1/
(a)

Affirmative actll requirement

11

The basic reason for the affirmative act requirement seems
to be that to punish mere nondisclosure would impose an undue burden
on the citizen:
To suppose that Congress reached every failure to
disclose a known federal crime, in this day of myriad
federal tax statutes and regulatory laws, would impose
a vast and unmeasurable obligation. It would do v i.o-:
lence to the unspoken principle of the criminal law
that "as far as possible privacy should be respected. 11
United States v. Worcester, 190F. Supp. 548,565-67,
(D. Ha ss . 1960) (dictum) (\-1yzanski,J.).
In ~

v. Nichaud, 114 A. 2d 352, 355 (Ne., 1955) the

court similarly suggested that the requirement of an affirmative act
was necessary to prevent overbroad application of the statute:

l.l

l.~ea1v , United States, 102 F. 2d 643, 646 (8th Cir. 1939); Lancey
v. Unj~te'dStates, 356 F. 2d 407) 409 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. den. %5
U.S-:-922; U~:.it2d States v. !:in3_)402 F. 2d 694, 695 (9th Cir-:l963).
[12286]
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_The act of concealment must be alleged.
Otherwise,
a person could be tried and erroneously convicted on
slight evidence that was only to the effect that he
was in the vicinity of where a felony was "ac t ua Ll.y"
c omm Lt t ed , and from that improperly argue [sic] that
he must have "known ;!' and that he concealed because
He might not have
he knew and did "not disclose."
seen. He might not have known or understood all the
facts.
A dictum of Chief Justice
reluctance

of the judiciary

Marshall

to construe

to punish bare non-disclosure

also reflects

misprision

statutes

the
so as

of information:

It may be the duty of a_ citizen to accuse every
offender, and to proclaim every offense which
comes to his knowledge; but the law which would
punish him in every case, for not performing this
duty, is too harsh for man.
Marbury v. Brooks,
7 Ylheat. 556, 575-76 (1822).

(b)

Degree

of knowledge

Several
conviction

Federal

require~

cases state that in order to support

for misprision,

it is necessary

had "full know.Ledge " of the commission

a

to prove that the defendant

of the crime by the principal.

Neal v. United

States,

United

356 F. 2d (f07, Lf09 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. den. 385 U. S.

States,

-922; pnited

102 F. 2d 643, 646 (8th Cir. 1939); Lancey v.

States v. Kin~, 402 F. 2d 694, 695 (9th Cir. 1968).

Conunonwealth v ..~,

_318 Mass.

453, 458:...59(1945), the court intimated

that mere "susp Ic i.on" that a felony had been committed
the defendant's

(c)

silence

In

could not render

criminal.

Duty of a President
prision statute

of the United

The federal misprision

statute

reporteci to ;'some judge or other person

States under the mis-

requires

that felonies

in civil or military

be

authority
[12287]
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States.

II

The President

of the United

States

is the
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chief officer of the executive branch of the federal government.
Constitution, Article II, Section 1, clause 1.

He is the Commander

in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.
Article II, Section 2, clause 1.

U. S.

U. S. Constitution,

In view of the plain language of the

statute, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the President
is a Hperson in civil or military authority under the United States,ll

l/
within the meaning of the statute.
It is difficult to contend that all persons in civil or
military authority under the United States are, simply by virtue of
their positions,
of felony.

incapable of committ.ing the offen.se of misprision

Law enforcement officers have been prosecuted under

18 U.S.C. §4 __ although admittedly they were State, rather than
Federal, officials.

Bratton v. United States, 73 F. 2d 795

(10th

Cir. 1934); United States v~ Daddano, 432 F. 2d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir,
1970), ~.

dismissed 401 U.S. 967, cert. den. 402 U.S. 905.
In a case in which it is claimed that a United States official

has discharged his duty under 18 U.S.C. §4 by making a decision not
to prosecute a person known to have con®itted a felony, the appropriate
inquiry would seem to be ,vhether his decision not to prosecute constituted
the exercise of a function assigned to him by the Constitution or laws of
the United States.
1/

In England, the offense of misprlSl.On could be avoided by making
to the King. Concerning the punishment for concealment of

a report

felonies, Coke wrote:
From wh Lch punishment if any will save himself he
must follow the advice of Eracton, to discover it
to the King, or to some judge or magistrate that for
the administration of justice supplieth his place,
with all speed that he can.
3 Inst. Cop. 65.
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[12289]

GOVER.~MENT EXPENDITURES

A.

AT SAN CLEMENTE

AND KEY BISCAYNE

Facts
The report

submitted

on July 19, 1974, contains
the initiation

to the Committee

a detailed

of, installation

by the Inquiry

chronology

of and paynent

staff

of facts regarding
for fifteen

categories

1/
of government
N~xon's

1/

expenditures

private

properties

totaling

over $92,000 -

at San Clemente

at President

and Key Biscayne

in the

San Clenente
Fireplace Exhaust Fan
Heating System
Sewe r System
Landscape Construction
Den w.indovs
Boundary and Structural
Paving
Point Gazebo

$

*
and Maintenance
Surveys

Hand r a i.Ls

Beach

Cabana and Railroad

Crossing

388.78
12,983.00
3,800.00
27,018.C8
1,6uu.Ou
5,472.59
5,866.66
4,981.60
938.50
3,500.00

$66,614.03
Key Biscayne
Landscape Construction *
Lands cape l'Iain
tenance .~
Fence and Hedge Screen~
Shuffleboard

3,414.00
7,991.00
12,679.00
1,600.00
$ 25,684.00

*The Internal Revenue Service fOlliLd$58,954.77 of government eA~enditures at San Clenente and $8,433.76 of government expenditures at Key
Biscs3yne to have constituted taxable income to the President for the
same period.
The .it eras marked w i t h an as t er Ls k= we re found by the
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years

1969 through 1972.

Taxation

The Joint Committee

found tnat these expenditures

to the President.

These expenditures

on one or more of the following
(1) Although
Service,
because

either

(a) substantial

representatives~

by the Secret

in cost were incurred

desires

served a security

of the President
benefited

or his

the President

function.

which primarily

by the President

into question

was requested

increases

aesthetic

(2) An expenditure

taxable income

were brought

or (b) the item primarily

and only secondarily

was requested

constituted

Revenue

grounds:

an expenditure

of the personal

on Internal

benefited

or his representatives

the President
rather than

by the Secret Service.
(3) Although
the expenditure

an expenditure

had a security

was one that any ho~eowner

would

justifl<.:ai..i.on,

likely and routinely

make at his own e~~ense.
Various

expenditures

were also questioned
on Treasury,

!/

Postal

on the President's

in the course of hearings
Service,

and General

private

before

Government

properties

the SubcoS?~ttee

Appropr~ations

of

[cont'd]
Joint Committee staff,"but not by the IRS, to constitute taxable
income to the President.
Taxable income attributable to improvements for the year 1969 Here found by the Joint Committee staff
to be $62,441.75 and by the IRS to be $31,844.58.
The President
has not yet paid tax deficiencies attributable to 1969. Any such
payment wo uLd be voluntary because the applicable Statute of
Limitations has run in respect to that year.

[12291]
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the House Appropriations
the Governmenf
Operations
General
House

Activities

Committee

Government

Operations

Committee

in May 1974.

private

Each investiga-

amount of nonprotective

properties

This memorandum

although

upon the Members

irnprove-

Has inproper1y

does not purport

of those determinations,

course, is conclusive

of the House Government

1973; and in a report by the

that some significant

by the GovernHent.

before

1973; in a report by the Comptroller

in December

on the President's

the accuracy

in June 1973; in hearings

Subcommittee

in October

to the Congress

tion concluded
ments

Committee

financed

to review'

none of the reports,

of this Committee

of

as to any

issue.
The evidence
the character
procured,

tending

to sh ow Presidential

of these expenditures.

and the source

the manner

of their financing

knowledge

in which

of

they were

is as fo110\\1s:

San Clemente
1.

The President

visited

San Clemente

from March

21 to

1/
March

23, 1969.

During

discussions

with Harold

consultant,

regarding

Mrs. Nixon

also walked

that the renovation

that period,

Lynch,

he and his family had

the President's

private

the design of the swimming
the grounds

with Lynch

work be done in a manner

architectural

pool to be constructed.

and expressed

her desire

that would preserve

the

]j
informal

atmosphere

of the estate.

1/

Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, "President
Nixon's Visits to the Hestern l,fui
te House, San Clemente, California"
(Source:
Agnes Haldron, I',.'hite
House, August 28, 1973); Lynch and
Kalmbach staff Ln t ervf.ews,)

:?:...l

Lynch

staff Ln t ervf.ew,
[12292]
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2.

The President

visited

San Clemente

J./

June 4 to June 7~.1969 in conjunction
this period

discussions

the President
be performed

were

over the period

with a trip to Honolulu.

taking place among representatives

and Secret Service

and GSA personnel

regarding

During
of

wo rk to

on the estate.

3.

The President

visited

San Clemente

for a month

Jj
between

August

followed

9 and September

the completion

8, 1969.

of the major

This period

renovation

immediately

work undertaken

on

the estate.
On August

11, 1969 the President,

met in the President's

office

diary notes of that meeting
~c~plime~t~ry

Ehrlichman,

and Kalmbach

at the \'lesternWhite House.

state,

"[President]

was extremely

re the job that was done 0n the homesite

host a reception

from 6-7 p.m. on Tuesday

Kalmbach's

afternoon.

and ..•

[will]

I'm to invite

3/
people

largely

responsible

for the success

of the project[,]"-'

including

!!./
all government

as well as non-governmental

This reception
expressed
}_/
basis.

1:./

his appreciation

Library
Nixon's
fornia
ll

\-las held

personnel.

the following

day and the President

to many of those attending

on an individual

of Congress, Congressional Research Service, "President
Visits to the Hestern \\ThiteHouse, San Clemente, Cali(Source:
Agnes Waldron, Hhite House, August 28, 1973).

!:_/

Id.

1/

Herbert H. Kalmbach diary, August
gate Special Prosecution Force).

!:!./

Herbert H. Kalmbach testimony,
1974, transcript, 4830.

~/

Id.,.

11, 1969 (received from Water-

House Judiciary

Committee

July 17,

4830-31; Inquiry staff Lnt ervi.ews of Ha t haway and Lynch.
[12293]
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4.

Alexander Butterfield has testified that the

President was livery interested in the grounds at Key Biscayne,
Camp David, San Clemente, the cottage, the house, the grounds

1/
1'-

Kalmbach testified that there was "a great interest [by

the President] in all things relative to that [San Clemente] property,"
and related that on one occasion when he walked the San Clemente
grounds Vlith President and Hrs. Nixon the President indicated that
!::_/
he wished the arrangement of various rose bushes to be changed.
The normal and more frequent procedure was for the President
to discuss the details of the wo rk and operations at San Clemente

l/
with Ehrlichman or H. R. Haldeman, who would pass along instructions.
Kalmbach testified, "1 had a standard procedure to run all questions
Lclativ€ tv matters pertaining to San Clemente past Mr. EhrlichWilll
!!_/
and Mr. Haldeman for their approval and direction.
5.

The President visited San Clemente from December 30,

2/

1969, to January 8, 1970.

1/

Alexander Butterfield testimony, House Judiciary Committee,
July 2, 1974 transcript, 2442.

2/

Herbert H. Kalmbach testimony, House Judiciary Committee,
July 17, 1974 transcript, 4824.

1/

Inquiry staff Ln t erv Lew of John Dean.

Ii/

lierbert I~. Kalmbach testimony, House Judiciary Cmmuittee,
July 17, 1974 transcript, 4827.

2/

Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, "President
Ni.xon IS Visits to the Hestern \\T11ite
House, San Clemente, Ca1if orn La" (Source: Agnes Ha1dron, Hhite House, August 28, 1973).
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On January 15, 1970 Kalmbach talked to Ehrlichman by

1/

telephone and it was agreed, apparently with the President's. assent,

that GSA should be given responsibility for the upkeep of the residence.
6.

In total, the President spent 47 days at San Clemente
]j
in 1969, 53 days in 1970, 54 days in 1971 and 41 days in 1972.
7.

In the February 28, 1973 tape recorded conversation

between the President and Dean, the following exchange occurred:

P.
D.
P.

They can't get his [Kalmbach's] records with
regard to his private transactions?
No - that's privileged.
That's right.
Anything to do with San Clemente and the like that is just so far out of bounds.
Yeah. Did they ask for that?
No, no, no - No indication.
11
Good. Oh, well, even if it is [unintelligible]

8.

On August 20, 1973 Coopers and Lybrand gave to

P.
D.
P.
D.

President and }frs. Nixon a specific b reakdown of the amount and

!!j
manner of expenditure of their personal funds at San Clemente.
9.

On December 8, 1973 the President announced his

intention to donate his San Clemente residence to the Nation after

51
his and }irs. Nixon's death.

11 See Inquiry staff report, pp. 61-63.
'!:_I

Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, "President
Nixon's Visits to the h'estern fmite House, San Clemente,
California" (Source: Agnes Ha1dron, 1ffiiteHouse, August 28, 1973).

1/

"Transcripts of Eight Recorded Presidential Conversations,"
House Judiciary Con®ittee, Serial No. 34, }Iay-June, 1974, at p. 43.

il

Statement on President and Hrs. Nixon's finances - January 1, 1969,
to Nay 31, 1973, Hhite House Press Release, December 8, 1973, 9
Presidential Documents llf38.

2./

President Nixon's statement, 111hiteHouse Press ReLease , December 8;
1973, 9 Presidential Documents 1413.
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Key Biscayne
1.

-

The President spent 32 days at Key Biscayne in 1969,

1/

34 days in 1970, 47 days in 1971, and 44 days in 1972.
2.

In December 1968 the President personally designated

the type of fence which he wished to.surround the Key Biscayne

'!:j
compound.
3.

Construction at the Key Biscayne compound was delayed

because of the President's April 2-6, 1969, visit there.

GSA

documents reflect that during this time the President designated
that certain landscape construction be undertaken.
4.

On

i/

August 20, 1973 Coopers and Lybrand gave President

and Mrs.Nixon a specific breakdown on the amount and manner of the
!!_/
exper.df t urc 'of their personal fuadc vat Y.:eyBiscayne.

l/

Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, "President
Nixon's Visits to the Florida Hhite House, Key Biscayne, Florida"
(Source: Agnes Haldron, lfuite House, August 28, 1973).

!:_/

See Inquiry staff report, pp. 71-72.

1/

Id. at pp. 66-67.

!!_/

Statement on President and Hrs. Nixon's finances - January 1, 1969
to May 31, 1973, 9 Presidential Documents 1438.
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B.

Theories

1.

of the Evidence

Constitutional

Article

Theory

II, Section

I of the Constitution

provides

in

part:
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for
his services, a Compensation, which shall neither be
increased nor diminished during the Period for which
he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive
within that Period any other Emolument from the
United States or any of them. II

2.

Criminal

Law

Title 18, §64l of the U. S. Code, entitled
property

or records,"

"Public money,

states:

Hhoever embezzles, steals, pu r Lo tn s , or knowingly
converts to his use or the use of another, or
without authority, sells!conveys or disposes of
any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of
the United States or of any department or agency
thereof; or
Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same
wf.t.hintent to convert it to his use or gain, knowing
it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both; but if the value
of such property does not exceed the sum of $100,
he shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
not more than one year, or both ...

II

Black's Law Dictionary defines "emolument" as "any perquisite,
advantage, profit, or gain arising from the possession of an
office.t1

[12297]
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c.

Discussion

The fact that requests
items or costs were initiated
his representatives
President

nmy be thought

professional

judgment

Ehrlichman's

instructions

±mprovements

provide

unlikely
matters

to support

Service

personally

had not made an independent

as to what portions
financed

to tax implications),

wf.t h a President

that the

for security.

given prior to the installation

details

that Ehrlichman

or by

an argument

that such an item was necessary

should be publicly

sensitivity

of questionable

by the President

was aware the Secret

he thought

for a number

of some

of those expenditures

(as we Ll, as displaying

some

II
and it can be argued that it is

did not discuss

such personal

whom both Butterfield

financial

and Kalmbach

described
')

,

-,
as hlghly
Finally,
intention
illusory

lnterested

it can be argued

impact

will

ot operations

to the Federal

on the emoluments

such as landscape

issue,

or his family

to be enjoyed

since

maintenance

and (b) the use and benefit

continue

at San Clelnen~e.

that the effect of the President's

to donate San Clemente

expenditures,
recovered,

in the details

government

announced

has

(a) many of the

costs, can never be

of the "permanent"

improvements

for some years by either the President

(in some cases perhaps

throughout

the useful life of

the improvement).

II

See Appendix

']._I

See supra
pages 6-7. ·It should be noted that Ehrlichman
never been intervie\ved in connection Vlith the Impeachment
Inquiry.

A to Inquiry

staff report.
has

[12298]
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On the other hand,
expenditures-had
the President

a

sufficiently

amounts

plausible

(himself not a technical

have been automatically
Moreover,

it may be felt that most of these

alerted

security

security

even as to items that had no apparent

at the time that payment

that

expert) would not

to any potential

to no more than speculation

purpose

impropriety.
security

purpose,

to say that the President

it

was informed

for these items had come out of public

1:_/
rather

than personal

to donate his San Clemente
own and Mrs. Nixon's
bursement

circumstances

property

death,

of any emolument
More

The President's

funds.

to the United

could be regarded

it may be thought

President

demand

intention

States,

as effecting

he might have received

fundamentally,
of a modern

announced

relative

after his
a reimthereto.

that the duties and

that a certain amount of

!:_/
protective

benefit

be conferred

and that to impeach
,~thout
with

a prior

demonstration

the practice,

breach

a modern

would

of a standard

on his person by the government,

President
of public

represent

for receipt

of such benefit,

or national

the imposition

dissatisfaction

of a sanction

for

of which he did not have fair notice.

1/

The Summary of Information states, at p. 3: liThe President knew
of the improvements as they were being made from his visits to
San Clemente and Key Biscayne; presumably
he also knew that he
was not personally paying for them."
(emphasis supplied)

!:_/

In this regard it should be noted that the GAO Report cited
significant nonprotective
government eA~enditures in connection
with an airstrip located on the LBJ Ranch in Texas, including
$34,000 relating to alterations on President Johnson's airplane
hangar there.
GAO Report, 87-88. Total expenditures in connection
'nth President Nixon's private properties total
approximately
$17 million in comparison wLt h approximately $S. 9 million spent
in connection with President Johnson's private properties.
See
Inquiry staff report, page 83.
[12299]
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The arguments
receipt

of converted

those applicable

relevant

United

States

to the Emoluments

also be necessary

to demonstrate

intent

the public

to convert

The existence

of such intent

with wh i ch the improvements
the furtiveness
embezzle

to the legal theory of knowing

commonly

funds are largely
Clause,

except

that it would

that the President

property

in question

tends to be negated
were made;

associated

the same as

had a criminal
to his own use.

by the openness

there is no suggestion

with

conscious

efforts

of

to

or convert.

[12300]
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v.
TAX DEDUCTION

B.

1.

As

stated

by the Staff

Revenue

Taxation,

for 1969

through

1972":

On his

sonal

The

restrictions
with

tax return

remaining

The amount
was

$95,298.

in subsequent
1971,
has

subsequent

and that

that the date of

the value
that

of per-

of the gift was

there were

the gift was

no

free and clear,

in the taxpayer.
gift alLowe d as a deduction

and in 1972,
totaling

presumably

consisted

materials;

indicated

to the United

for this gift

$134,093.

in 1970,

over

Since

of $93,982

and taken

$123,959;

Accordingly,

$482,018.

deductions

carried

in 1969

the President

the gift
remain

in

is valued

for

years.

A deed
delivered

that the gift

on

Nixon

contribution

[were ] as f oLl.ows:

deductions

at $576,000,

idxon' s Tax Returns

and that

also

deductions

years

$128,668;

taken

of this

The

of President

and other

27, 1969;

on the gift

no rights

Committee

for 1969, President

indicated

manuscripts,

the gift was March
$576,000.

filed

of the Joint

for a charitable

The tax return

papers,

Report

"Examination

tax return

a deduction

States.

OF PAPERS

Facts.

Internal

claimed

FOR GIFT

for this

gift of papers,

to the General

Services

dated

March

Administration

27, 1969,
shortly

was

after

[12302]
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April
but

1970.

10;

rather

This

by Edward

who was

on John

whether

Mr. Morgan

deed was not
L. Morgan,

Ehrlichman's
had

signed

a deputy

staff.

counsel

Questions

the authority

the deed was backdated,

by President

to sign

and also whether

Nixon

to the President

have

been

raised

the deed, whether

a deed was necessary

for this gift.
The President

1968.

also made

States

in

excess

of the maximum

in that year,
but

a Ll.owab La

in effect.

Act

repealed

of

This

deduction
July

had

25, 1969,

question
Nixon
(Joint

contributions

Report,

t h rough

and the President

deductions

of allowing

whether

in future

years,

of the charitable

for gifts

retroactively

if they were
made

made

after

the gift of papers

'vas completed

which,

Revenue

a charitable

prior

1972.

signed,

amendments

of the Internal

if they were

cLa i me d a deduction
Co~~ittee

passed,

of papers

availatle

1969 was large enough to account

these provisions

but not

has arisen

to be used

1969 wh Lch contained

the effect

for gifts

to the United

deduction

the amount

charitable

contribution

1969 Act repealed

1969,

in

provisions

charitable

contribution

available

because

1969, the Congress

the Tax Reform

allowing

was

by the President

for the maximum
In

charitable

used

of papers

1968 the amount of the gift was in

in

a carryover

it has not been

contribution

The

Since

a gift

Code
of papers.

as of July

25,

contribution

on or before
that date.

The

for wh Lch President
to July

25, 1969.

p. 9.)

[12303]

-37, 1973, the Internal Revenue Service formally

On December
notified
return

the President

of Infornation,

by the President

Book X, lIReport Respecting

The next day the President

Congress

made public

since his assumption

tax return

Joint Committee

(P.JC,

Deduction

Taken

27, 196911 (hereafter lITax Reportll), Appendix

to be made on March

hj,.sincome

income tax

1969 through 1972 for Gift of Papers Claimed

for Years

cial transactions

that their federal

1970, 1971 and 1972 would be reexamined.

for the years

Statement

and 11r5. Nixon

for the years

on Internal

to examine

Revenue

certain

a full accounting

3.)

of his finan-

of office in 1969, including

1969-72, and he requested
Taxation

items therein

of the United

to deternine

the

States

if they had

1/
been correctly

reported.

The Joint Committee

and the IRS thereafter

examination

of the President's

President's

deduction

pre-presidential

returns,

and concluded

on the 1969 and subsequent

papers

should not be allowed.

conducted

an'

in part that the

returns of the gift of
The IRS stated the issue

as follm"s:
Did the taxpayer
pre-presidential

make a completed

papers

to the United

gift of certain
States between

January

1969 and July 25, 1969, so that he could avail himself
charitable

deduction

Report, Exhibit

1/

under section

170 of the Code?

1,

of a
(IRS Audit

1, p. 1.)

The Summary of Information states, "only after the President learned
that the IRS was going to re-audit his returns did he request the
Joint CODJrJitteeon Internal Revenue Taxation to examine his deduction
for the gift of papers."
(p. 11) It seems possible that if the matter
had not been referred to Congress, questions such as those raised in
the Summary of Information, concerning the thoroughness of the exal.lination conducted by personnel of the Executive branch, might have remained.

[12304]
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The joint Committee

The charitable
of papers

deductions

from 1969-1972

be allowed because

concluded

as follows:

($482,018)

taken for gift

should not, in the staff's view,

the gift was made after July 25, 1969, the

date when the provisions

of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 dis-

allowing

became

such deductions

that in view of the restrictions

effective.

and retained

in the deed of the gift of papers,
for the gift.
was signed
parties)

The deed

on April

rights contained

that· the deed is necessary

(dated :Harch 27, 1969) which purportedly

21, 1969, was not signed

(at least by all

until April 10, 1970 and wa s not delivered

that date.

It should

by Edward Morgan

In addition,
the papers

until after

also be noted that this deed was signed

(rather than the President),

found no evidence

delivered

The staff believes

that he was authorized

the deed stated
to the United

and the staff

to sign for the President.

that its delivery

conveyed

title to

States and since the deed was not

until after April

10, 1970, it is clear that title

could not have been conveyed

by ,.;ray
of the deed until after

July 25, 1969.

because

in the opinion

Furthermore,

the gift is so restricted,

of the [Joint Corunittee) staff, it is a gift of a

future interest

in tangible

tible currently

under the law, even if the gift wa s valid

other respects:

that is, it had been Dade and the deed delivered

prior

to July 25, 1969.

personal

property,

(Joint Connittee

which

Report,

is not deducin all

p , 5)

[12305]

-5The Joint Committee

any attempt

to "draw any conclu-

'ther e" was, or was not, fraud or negligence

sions whether

any aspect of the returns,
personal

disavowed

either on the part of the President

representatives."

vo~va1 was predicated
in an investigation

involved

(Joint COlllnitteeReport,

on the fact that this Committee
of whe t.h er grounds

p. 4)

in

or his

This disa-

was then involved

exist for the impeachment

of

the President.
The IRS, on the other hand,
concluded

that "inconsistencies

of the President's

abound[ed]"

representatives

that a grand jury investigation

in the course of the investigation,
between

involved

the various

in the gift of papers,

"las war ran t ed to determine

had been comm i.t t ed by these representatives.

stories

(Tax Report,

whe t he r fraud
Appendix

l-lowpver_ ]ike the Joint Conunittee, the IRS made no allegations
against

2~d

n

of fraud

the President.
On April

to the Special
sentatives:

2, 1974, the fraud investigation

Prosecutor

in the naDes

(Tax Report,

and Edwa rd L. Morgan,
Appendix

8)

referred

of three of the Presidentfs

Frank De...N1arco
, his attorney;

the papers;

~vas formally

repre-

Ralph Newman , the appraiser

formerly

Deputy

The Special Prosecutor

Counsel

of

to the President.

has recently

begun a

grand jury investigation.
The evidence

w i.t h

respect

to Presidential

In a meeting

b etwe en then President-elect

involvement

is as

folloHs:

Lyndon

Johnson

in 1968, President-elect

bility

of making

Nixon and President

Nixon bec~e

a gift of his historical

papers,

aware of the possi-

and taking a charitable

[12306]
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deduction

on his federal

(Tax Report,
cussions

-

ns. 1 and 2)

with Richard

feasibility

discussed

signed

1968 the President

then his tax attorney,

versions

8'70

memorandum.

telephoned

in one or both deeds.

the 1968 deed, which was transmitted
arrangements

for the 1968 gift.

dent signed his 1968 tax return,

deduction

for future years.

carryover

wa s attached

remaining

to the return

of any restrictions

the gift was free and clear,

on public access

(Tax Report,

n. 6)

(Tax Report,

n. 7)

a deduction

including

no rights

who then
The Presi-

of $70,552.00
db

d

vlith IRS regulations,

infornation

as to the

It said in substance
remaining

to

Mr. Nixon

back to Mr. Ritzel,

In accordance

on the gift.
w i.t h

and they

$~ ,4L;;. 73 was made ava i.Labi.e

r Th e

existence

the

On the evening

Mr. Ritzel,

Ivhich included

for the 1968 ~ift.

a statement

concerning

ns. 3-5)

r.lemorandum and the restrictions

contained

completed

had dis-

of the 1968 deed of gift and

(Tax Report,

28, 1968, the President

Ritzel's

the papers

Ritzel,

from Ritzel

explanatory

of December

In mid-December,

value.

and requireLlents of such a gift, and on Decer.lber27 or 28,

1968 he received
a covering

income tax return for their fair market

that

in the taxpayer.

1/
(Tax Report, ns. 8, 9)On February
President

in regard

6, 1969, John Ehrlichman

to gifts and charitable

memd.l:andum, Lhrlichnan

recited

contributions.

the 1968 gift of papers,

that the President

could continue

tion of 30 percent

of his adjusted

1/

sent a memorandum

to obtain

the maximum

to the

In this

and suggested
charitable

deduc-

gross income by first contributing

to

It may be argued that the facts in this paragraph indicate t~at the
P'res i rie n t ",'asinvolved in and wa s awa re of the requirer:ents and procedures for the 1968 gift of papers; and that the President had harl
experience of at least one method of executing a gift of his papers:
[12307]
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-7charity
equal

procee~s

!r~m

to 20 percent

the sale of the President's

of his

contemplate

of your
keeping

papers

is a notation

hand",riting,

for

a bulk

states
tt

idea-.
gift

"I.

memoranda

mentioned

the full

and posed

questions

purportedly

taxes.

On November
to the President,
slightly

over

1969 Newman
the staff
introduced
received

attended

at his

Morgan

raised
n.

a \;'hiteHouse

June

to the President,

the prelisinary

in this memorandum

by

appraisal.

would

to

be sufficient

for 1969 and succeedEhrlichr:lan sent

16, 1969.

deduction

tHO

One of these

for the 1969

the President

tax year

himself

in

1/
34)-

Newman

sent a preliminary
pre-Presidential

(Tax Report,
prayer

n. 38)

breakfast.

Lrit.e
rv Lew that as he stood

himself

we can use

in the President's

16, 1969,

the President's
dollars.

which

Let me know what we can do on

dated

30 percent

7, 1969 Ralph

DvO million

2.

On June

(Tax Report,

valuing

apparently

deduction

Counsel

"to the

to add up to the 30% maximum."

charitable

to Deputy

to his

reserve

1969 which

n.lO)

respect

In this Hay He

in the year

30 percent

(Tax Report,

States.

is no reference

There

memoranda

regard

gifts

Good

of papers

the President's

ing years.

other

With

in an amount

that it wou Ld "be made

as a continuing

on the memorandum,

which

the foundation

to the United

the papers

from nOH on to supplement

income.

noted

II

up of a gift

making

gross

10;~) Ehrlichrnan' s memorandum

remaining

There

adjusted

writing

papers

Newman

the President

The President

at

On November

in the receiving

he asked

appraisal

replied

stated

16,
to

line and
if he had
that he did

It may be argued that the facts in this paragraph are probative of
the proposition
that the President did not have an intention in 1969
of making a b~lk ~ift of papers with car~yover consequences,
[12308]
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receive
could

the appraisal,

be so high.

and stated

Newman

told

that he did not believe

the President

that

that the figure

the figure

was

a con-

II
servative

estimate.

(Tax Report,

On December

30, 1969

n. 39)

the President

signed

the Tax Reform

Act

])
of 1969.

Th~s

actively

establishing

charitable

donations
The

leading
return

extrewely

final

to the gift
on April

DeHarco,
including
present

complex

a cut-off

(Tax Report,

On that date,

at that meeting,

n. 45)
involvemer.t in the events

and has

signing

the President's

and explained

for the gift

of his

before

1969

attorney,

the tax return

of papers.

testified

retro-

25, 1969 for effective

is the Pr~sident's

the President

the deduction

of July

of Presidential

of papers

10, 1970.

met with

date

of papers.
instance

contair.ed a provision

statute

Eerbert

tax

Frank

to him,

Kalmbach

the Committee

was
that the

1/
President

and Dei"!arcowent

the tax consequences
mony,
said

7/17/74,
that his

1/

the return

of the gift

T 4864-65).
explanation

ing to the appraisal

over

of papers

In his

deduction

and discussed

(Kalmbach

Lnt arv Lew w i t h the Staff,

to the President

by Newman

page by page

and stating,

consisted

testi.-

DeL'1arco

of D~'1arco's point-

IIThis, of course,

is

It may be argued that the facts in this paragraph are probative of
the proposition
that, as of Novenber,
1969, the President did not
have an understanding
that a gift of his papers had been Hade in
April of that year.
Based on the President's
signature of this statute, which takes up more
than 300 pages in the U. S. Code Congressional
and AC:':1inistrativeNeIVs,
the Sumriary of Information
concludes, "There can be no doubt that the
President knew that the Tax Reform Act required that, for the cLaira of
a deduction
to be valid, a gift l:1UStbe comp Le t ed by July 25, 1969. "
(Summa r y of Information,
p. 2)

11

The statement that the gift had been made on March 27, 1969 was cont a Ln ed in an a t t achtae n t to the return.
(Summa ry of Lnf orraa t Lon , p. 1)

[12309]
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the appraisal

~up~orting

away."

According

fine."

DeMarco

the gift

DeHarco

has

return

while

question
basis

has said

was

The Minority
President's

taxes

he was

met with

taken

analysis

years.

of the tax

there was no

a refund

and that a

for the gift

Hrs. Nixon

(Tax Report,

the deed giving

for several

getting

gave

told the President

but he said

the deduction

DeHarco

Theories

knew

you

wa s "That's

about

DeMarco

be a tax shelter

the President,

the President

on the return.

2.

States.

which

response

no discussion

there \Vas no in-depth

he was with

thereafter,

signature

would

that

for the refund

Shortly

there was

to the United

of papers

stated

that

for the papers

to DePillrco, the President's

of papers

that the gift

the deduction

of papers.

and obtained

her

n. 68)

of the Evidence.
staff

submit

is not whether

that

the issue with

the deduction

respect

to the

for the gift of papers

1/
was

valid

or invalid.

tative

of the President

papers

or the preparation

Nor

is the issue

committed

fraud

whether

any personal

in connection

of the return.

The

with

represen-

the gift of

pr Lriary issue

is whe t h er the

]j
President

committed
Section

to Evade

or Defeat

acts

constituting

7201 of the Internal

"lVillful tax evasion.
Revenue

Code,

entitled

"Attempt

Tax,'" provides:

1/
Under applicable
Law , the burden of es t ab lishing the validity of
the deduction
falls upon the President.
The burden of proof in this
Inquiry is not with the President.

]j
As the SUDUl1aryof Information
states, "Here mistake or negligence
by the President
in filing false tax re~urns would clearly not
provide grounds for Lmpe achmen t ;." (S~mmary of Informatio;,
pp. 3-4)
[12310]
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Any person who w i Ll fu Ljy attempts in any manner
to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or
the payment thereof shall, in addition to other
penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and,
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$10,000.00, or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both, together with cost.of prosecution.

3.

Discussion.

In order to establish
Section

a case of willful

tax evasion under

7201, there must be proof not only of willfulness

of the taxpayer,

but also of affirmative

c:Ieceit,concealment,
of fraud."

misrepresentation,

In Spies v. United

Suprene Court

State~,

on the part

acts of w ron gdoLrig, such as
and the other usual "badges
317 U. S. 492 (1943),the

stated:

By way of illustration, and not by way of limitation,
we would think a f f Lrma t i.vewillful attempt
may be
inferred from conduct such as keeping a double set of
books, making false entries or alterations, or false
invoices or documents, destruction of books or records,
concealment of assets or covering up sources of income,
handling of one's affairs to avoid naking the records usual
in transactions of the kind, and any conduct, the likely
effect of which would be to mislead or to conceal ..

Other
to constitute

cases are instructive

fraudulent

the fraudulent

deductions.

taking of unjustified

tory, Un:!:_ted
States v , Kelley,
of extensive
securities

deductions

Such fraudulent
deductions

of acts necessary
deductions

based on false inven-

for losses on sales of securities

shortly bought back by the taxpayer,
denied

include

105 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1939); the claiming

were sold to close friends

702 (2d Cir. 1942)~ert_.

on the character

at "bargain
United

prices"

States

V.

su_1::_.
norr. ~los~O\v~

V.

where

the

and very

Schenck,
United

126 F.2d
States.,

[12311]

-11316 U.S. 705 (1942); and the cl~imine
and taken as a deduction

of a loan made by the taxpayer

for "purchases,"

BarshoE. v. United-States,

thus reducing

income,

192 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1951), cert deniee!,

342 U.S. 920 (1952).
It may be argued
acts of wrongdoing

tha~ the 1970 events reveal affirmative

on the part of the President's

1/
Newman , DeMarco
President
wrongdoing
tatives.

could be charged w i t.h willfulness
unless he knew of any fraudulent

of fraudulent

representatives,

Howe ve r , it is difficult

and/or Morgan.

The evidence

personal

to see how the

or with an affirmative
acts by his personal

does not seem to bear out Presidential

acts by his subordinates

in connection

Newman

falsification

and Horgan would

on their

of his close advisors.
to the President's
significance.
personal

0,,'Tl

undertake

without

with his tax rsturns.

posture

of the President

that

scheme of

checking w i t.h the taxpayer

The three men involved

affairs

a coordinated

The gift of papers was of enormous

financial

represen-

knowledge

On the one hand, it can be argued that it is doubtful
DeMarco,

act of

or one

importance

and was also of some historical
herein we re not customarily

of such magnitude

without

handling

some guidance.

The President has stated that he relied on his lmvyer, tax accountant,
and other subordinates to handle the gift. A h'hite House press statement dated April 4, 1974 states that any errors cODffilitted
by the President's
tax consultants were done without the President's approval.
The Summary of Information does not address this issue.
Good faith
reliance on one's attorney is a defense to the crininal charge.
Reliance
is a factual issue to be determined by a finder of ract. In a crininal
trial if the defendant raises the defense that he relied on someone else
to prepare the return, he is entitled to an instruction on that issue,
since the doctrine of respondeat superior applicable to a civil case
would not apply in a criminal case.
It should appear from the circumstances that the advisor had an apparent competence in the tax field.
In addition there must be a showing that the taxpayer actually believed
and followed the advice.
[12312]
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~
In addition,
that

.

-'

'."hen the President

he had signed

a deed in connection

he had signed

no deed for

the Presidency

in January,

The short
intent

in this

instance,

tax return

cealment,

that

If

pn the part

in the meeting

that

assuming

personal

grown

affairs.

recited

of April

fraud,

a taxpayer

that

has signed his

burden simply is

above, which falls
any act
usual

far

short

of deceit,

of

con-

"badges of fraud."

have Lnt er v i ewed two of the parti10, 1970 at which the President

neither

witness

the details

in the case interviewed

the President

wouLd have to rest

the burden is on the ComrJittee to

informed or even asked about

cated

that

of the President,

1969 tax return,

none of the witn~sses

since

and yet

had probably

allegations

the mer e fact

the Comn
Lt t ee and staff

signed his

althou~h

in his

rif.sr epte s en t a t Lon, or the other

Although

he knew

answer to the case of i;"puted -knmvlecfge and

by the evidence

demonstrating

'\'T2S

agents

the e Lernen t s of Presidential

not carried

cipants

through

is not enough.

establish

--

1969, the President

upon which any fraud
is

1969 tax return,

with the 1968 gift:

the 1969 gift

more accustomed to acting

inferred

signed his

stated

that

the President

of the gift.
by the

staff

had any awar eries s of the details

Indeed,
has indiof the

1/
circumstances

}j

surrounding

the gift

of papers.

In regard to the absence of evidence of Presidential
knowl edge ,
the failure
of the staff to submit interrogatories
to the President must weigh heavily in considering whether the Committee is
acting on a complete record.
Such written
questions can be
nar r owl y dr awn to elicit
na r r ow responses,
as the Lnt er r oga t or i.e s
drafted by the Joint Committee dernonst r a t e . The President has
indicated
that he would submit written responses under oath to
such interrogatories
if submi t ted by this Committee, but to date
el~ Committee has not seen fit
to avail itself
of that oppor t un lty .

[12313]
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The Sumrr.aryof Information
"may be inferred

argues

that willfulness

from all the events

and circumstances

the making of the gift and the preparation
return."

(Summary of Infonnation,

on the pa~~'of
dence before

the President

this Committee

and know Ledge

p . 4)

and execution
Hillfulness

cannot be inferred merely
concerning

surrounding

essentially

of the tax

and knowledge
from the evi-

the acts of other

individuals.

[12314]
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INTERNAL

A.

REVENUE

SERVICE

Facts

The following
commf.t.t ed acts of abuse

Internal

Revenue

discussion
of

p owe r

concerns whether

in connection

Service by obtaining

the IRS, and endeavoring

the President

the misuse of the

w.i t.h

confidential

to have the IRS initiate

has

tax information
or accelerate

from

investi-

gation of taxpayers.

1.

Report

on Gerald Wallace

Investigation

On or about }larch 21, 1970; Special
Clark Hollenhoff
Hollenhoff

transmitted

to H. R. Haldeman

from the IRS and dealing

lvallace's brother,

Gerald Hallace.

Counsel

to the President

material

obtained by

wf.t h the taxes of Governor

(Book VIII, p. 35)

George

Hollenhoff

had

been instructed

by Haldeman

to obtain a report from the IRS on an investi-

gation relating

to Governor

George Wallace

by Haldeman
dent.

that the report was to be obtained

Hollenhoff

discussed

states

the substance

of a news article
po r t s and the IRS

Administration

and Gerald Wallace,

that he neither

at the request of the Pres i-

gave copies

to anyone else nor

of it with anyone else until after the appearance

on April
IS

on assurances

13, 1970, that described

confidential

field re-

inves tiga tion of charges of corrup tion in the lvallace

and the activities

of Gerald "'allace.

(Book VIII, pp. 38-39).

[12316]
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Former
has stated
concluded
Treasury
Thrower

Cormnissioner of Internal

that an IRS investigation
that the material

Department.

closure
Haldeman

In an affidavit

submitted

nor Ehrlichman

he and the IRS Chief Counsel

at the Hhite House and discussed

constituted

indicated

a criminal

to Thrower

but they did appear to take the complaint

the future.

cooperate

Further,

in undertaking

Haldeman

wou Ld call the gravity

(Book VIII, pp. 40-42)

2.

List

In an affidavit

request,

he went

submitted

has stated

to Joh~ Dean's

with

dis-

Neither

the source of the leak,

to prevent

and assured Thrower
such incidents

in

assured Th rowe.r that they

to the attention

from time to time have access

information.

former IRS Commissioner,

act.

seriously

and Ehrlichman

of the situation

the Hhite House who might

E~e~ies

to the Committee,

of the leak and the fact that unauthorized

of IRS information

that they would

Thrmver

had not been leaked by the IRS or the

and Ehrlichman

tHem the seriousness

Randolph

of the leak of information

has also stated that thereafter

met with Haldeman

Revenue

to the Committee,
that on September

of those in
to such

Johnnie Halters,
11, 1972, at Dean's

office where he received

from Dean a list of

[12317]
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McGovern

staff members

and campaign

the IRS begin investigations
on the list.

contributors.

or examinations

(Book VIII, p. 240)

to be undertaken.

"would make the Watergate
and that he intended

affair

to discuss

and recommend

'(Book VIII, pp. 275-79)
this list to Walters

prinripal

contributors

to Shultz

that Dean would

(Dean iestimony,

HJCT pp. 3522-23)

examination
Halters
office

mentioned,

transcript

to give
Dean

the names of all the

from which a list of names
to Walters

showed Shultz

for IRS audits.

the list and advised
request

of the people named on the list.
to the list and Walters

to commence
Shultz told

put it in his

(Book VIII, pp. 275-79)

On September
Haldeman

had collected

in turn submit

with respect

--

of the Treasury

or John Ehrlichman.

campaign

--

be done on the request.

they should not comply 'vith Dean's

to do nothing

had asked this action

that he was instructed

Chotiner

13, 1972 Walters

or investigation

safe.

that nothing

that Chotiner

would be compiled

him that he believed

to have

advised Dean that compliance

the matter with Secretary

in the McGovern

On September

named

look like a 'Sunday school picnic'"

by either Murray

that he learned

that

for the IRS and the Administration

Dean has testified

testified

the President

Walters

with such a request would be disastrous

Shultz

of the individuals

Dean said he had not been asked by the President

this done, and that he did not know whether

George

Dean requested

prepared

IS!

1972,

during a conversation

among other things,
by the Inquiry

"Dean working

staff reflects

with the President,
through

the IRS." The

the following

exchange:

PRESIDENT:

[Unin t eLl.LgLb Le J

HALDE~'fAN:

John, he is one of the quiet guys that
gets a lot done.
too, bringing

PRESIDENT:

Yeah.

That was a good move,

Dean in.

But it's --

[12318]
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HALDE11AN:

It -~ He'll never, he'll never gain any
ground for us. He's just not that kind
a guy. But, he's the tind that enahles
other people to gain ground while he's
making sure that you don't fall through
the holes.

PRESIDENT:

Oh. You mean

F..ALDEHfu~
:

Betvleen times, he's doing, he's moving
ruthlessly on the investigation of McGovern
people, Kennedy stuff, and all that too. I
jus t don't know hov much progress he's
making, 'cause I -<

PRESIDENT:

The problem

EALDEHAl~:

Chuck, Chuck has gone through, you knoH, has
worked on the list, and Dean's working the,
the thing through IRS and, uh, in some cases,
I think, some other [unintelligible] things.
He's -- He turn~d out to be tougher than I
thought he woulJ, which is what

PRESIDENT:

Yeah.

Soon thereafter

and Haldeman

discussed

cript, pp. 3522-24)
about the problem

1/

(HJCT 1)

Dean entered

that in the last seventeen

minutes

is that's kind of hard to find.

the Room.

of that meeting,

the use of the IRS.

As Dean recalled

of having

Dean has testified

1/

he, the President

(Dean testimony,

the conversation,

the IRS conduct

Trans-

they talked

audits; Dean told the

On Hay 28, 1974 the ~.Jatergate Special Prosecutor moved that the
recording of the last portion of this meeting be turned over to
t~e appropriate grand jury because that recording was relevant to
the alleged Imi te House attempts to abuse and politicize the IRS,
including un Lawf ully attempting in August and September 1972 to
instigate an IRS investigation of O'Brien.
OQ July 12, 1974 Judge
Sirica granted the motion and ordered that the recording of the
conversation from 6:00,to approximately 6:13 p.m. be made available
to the Special Prosecutor.
The order was stayed pending appeal by
the President.
(Book VIII, pp. 3LI0-49)'
On June 24, 1972 the
Committee subpoenaed tapes, dictabelts, memoranda and other records
of the conversatjons.
Such J:1aterialshave not yet heen furnished
to the Cornnri,t; t ee •

[12319]
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President

and Haldeman

commence

audits;

and the President

been sufficiently
testimony,

of his difficulty

responsive

progress
develop

that, although

Shultz,

any activity

Walters

he would

reconsider

that nothing

Thereafter,

there "ere no further

Dean's

On July 11, 1973, Walters
on Internal

Revenue

the staff of the Joint Committee

screened

3.

National

about this

(Book VIII, p. 274-79)

turned the list over to the
Taxation.

On December

of any persons

20, 1973,

that it

on the list were

(Book VIII, pp. 280-85)

of Lawr en co 0' Brien

the summer of 1972, Commissioner

asked by Secretary

On

and no actions we re

as a result of lvhite House pressure.

During

Democratic

by Walters

issued a report stating

that the returns

Investigation

disaster.

to the list.

discussions

to the list.

res-

request ",ith Shultz and

be done with respect

taken by the IRS in regard

to

the matter with Secretary

during his tenure as IRS Commissioner

found no evidence

Dean that no

and Walters

of this type would be inviting

29th, l.valtersdiscussed

Joint Committee

informed

Dean asked if it might be possible

th~y agreed

matter

lvalters

the list of McGovern

on 50, 60 or 70 of-the names,

ponded

September

regarding

and contributors.

information

(Dean

25, 1972, Dean telephoned

as to the progress

had been made.

that Shultz had not

Book VIII, pp. 334-36)

On or about September

campaign workers

complained

to vJhite House requirements.

HJCT pp. 3523-24;

and inquired

in getting Walters-to

Shult~

hTalters was

to check on a report by Ehrlichman

Committee

Chairman

LaHrence

that

O'Brien
[12320]
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had

received

properly.

large

amounts

Ehrlichman

investigation

to Ehrlidunan
Barth

on the status

inquiries,

O'Brien

it was

generally

sensitive
revenue,
report

cases,
until

was

after

submitted

of O'Brien's

interviewed

to Shultz.

has

audits,

might

(Book VIII,
checked

pp. 224-25)

do.

which

were

that

more

of the return
closed,

(Book VIII,

pp.

until

Halters

information

after

Shultz

and

and that

Shultz

although
involving
or

conference

that Ehrlichman
about

that

the examination

the

to complain

the election.

on Republicans

advised

with

217-25)

informed

further

to

of Ehrlichman's

of 1972,

the IRS bureaucracy,

quickly

Halters

not satisfied

loss of position

pp.

that he called

the audit

concern

be moving

the filing

returns,
could

of his

reported

investigations

without

Shultz

pp. 223-25;

for 1970 and 1971,

the summer

(Book VIII,

testified

Halters

A copy of the taxpayer

and that he desired

that the IRS ,vas delaying
told Shultz

possihle

to the

did so and reported

(Book VIII,

Because

to postpone

on the O'Brien
Assistant

Barth

was

returns.

during

the election.

Barth,

returns

that Ehrlichman

time thereafter

Ehrlichman

Roger

5, 1974)

of O'Brien's

to the extent

satisfied

matter.

was

case report

tax returns.

June

the IRS's policy

A short
was not

Sess.,

from Shultz

asked

not have be en reported

seemed' in order.

examination

the report

a sensitive

O'Brien's

SSC Exec.

learned

wh Lch might

and had

the returns

on the IRS's

and later

earlier

to check

that

testimony,

Shultz

had received

sometime

IRS Commissioner,

of income

Ehrlichman

in its timing

of

than Democrats.
the IRS had
status

there was nothing

else

of those
the IRS

217-27)

[12321]
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On or ab9ut August
Walters

went to Shultz's

of the O'Brien

matter.

29, 1972, at the request

of Shultz,

office with Barth to conclude

the review

The three discussed

the matter

that the IRS could do no more,. and thereafter
Ehrlichman.
verified

Shultz and Halters

that O'Brien

of income,

informed

that the IRS had already

they jointly

Ehrlichman

had filed returns which
examined

and agreed

that the IRS had

reflected

large amounts

and closed their returns,

and that the three were all agreed

that ther-e was nothing

that the IRS could do.

indicated

to I'laltersthat he

Ehrlichman

further

disappoint~ent

"goddanID tiTed of his foo t

was

telephoned

-dr

and said

aaz Lnz tactics."

(Book VIII, pp. 227--35)
Haldeman
September

l5,

and Dean have testified

1972 meeting

wI t h the President

of taking· steps to overcome
up on complaints.
by SSC Minority
to the President,
Dean reported

l/
Counsel

the umlillingness

(Book VIII, pD. 333-36)
Fred Thompson,

has stated

their

there was a discussion
of the IRS to folloH
Ac co r d in <:; to an affidavit

J. Fred Buzhardt,

that during

on the IRS investigation

that during

the September

of Lawrence

Special

Counsel

15, 1972 ~eetillg

O'Brien.

(Book VIII,

pp. 337-39)

1.1

Both this Committee and the Special Prosecutor have attempted
to obtain a tape of the last 17 minutes of this conversation.
See footnote 1, S\.wYa, p . 4.

[12322]
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Other Tax Information

4.

The Summary
instances

in which a member

information
viduals.

of Information

and attempted

briefly

of Dean's

adverts

to a number

staff obtained

confidential

to have audits performed

There is no competent

evidence

on certain

of Presidential

of

indi-

knowledge

of,

1/
or involvement
reference

to securing

conversation

although

in, any of these cases,

between

information

there is an apparent

from the IRS in the transcript

John Dean and the President

on March

of the

13, 1973:

PRESIDENT:

Do you, need any IRS [unintelligible]

DEAt'l'
:

Uh

stuff?

Not at the

***
0EAN:

. Uh, ~here is no need at this nour
for anything
of sources

from IRS, and we have a couple

over there that I can go to.

don't have to fool around with Johnnie
or anybody,
He'need.

I
Walters

we can get right in and get wh a t
(HJCT 50)

]j
Dean's Executive Session testimonv before the Senate Select
(Book VIII, p. 154) suggests that'the President wanted the
off on friends of his."
A subsequent staff .in t erv i ew 'vith
indicated that Dean learned of this not from the President,
Higby.

Committee
IRS "turned,
Dean has
but from

».»

.'

-'
[12323]
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B.

Discussion
Many of the alleged

Gerald Wallace
With respect

to the O'Brien

on O'Brien,

is a suggestion

which

Thompson

September

investigation,

or to encourage

Minority

between

in hand does

Ehrlichman

to obtain

of. those activities,

that J. Fred Buzhardt

15, 1972 conversation

1/

know.l.e
dge ,

an audit of his taxes.

knowledge

of Fred Thompson,

states

the evidence

urged or ordered

of Presidential

in the affidavit
I

of IRS abuse, e.g., the

case, are very weak in terms of Presidential

not shm" that the President
information

instances

Counsel

tax

There
however,

to the SSC, in

had informed

the President

him that the

and Dean con-

]j
cerned a report by Dean on the tax investigation
The Enemies
ledge.
informed

The tape in the possession
the President

investigation
the IRS.

Dean's

Walters

case for Presidential

people,

testimony

a second

and working

indicates

audits,

know-

of the Comm.it t ee shows that Haldeman

that Dean was mov Lng "ruthlessly"

of HcGovern

use the IRS to conduct
Johnnie

List is a stronger

of O'Brien.

on the

the "thing"

that the President

and that Dean thereafter

through

urged him to
contacted

time to ask if there had been any action on

1/
A potentially applicable criminal statute is 26 U.S.C. § 7213 which
prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of tax information by any
officer or employee of the United States.

2/
A criminal statute which might apply to this situation is 26 U.S.C.
§ 7212, entitled "Attempts
to interfere with administration of
internal reveuu e Laws
Howe'ver , this statute is usually applied
to persons who attempt to prevent the execution of the Revenue Code.
i

"
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the list of McGoverri staff
several

days

that

if the President

if he had knowledge

purposes,

acquiescence

the President

thousands

or excuse

government
three

agency,

or four such

establish

men make
that

Dean's

Walters

examples

of the heart

the context

in the course

of gross

abuse

If it is believed

involving

example

of misuse

of

a certain
to
of a

that one or two, or even
of five years,

of politics,

as ~vell as of the head;
should

exami-

hundreds

reveal

of powe r sufficient

In the heat

is political

w Lt h respect

activities

in any way attempting

or limited

to

the IRS for political

wou l.d probably

Hithout

to go back

is that a minute

tenure,

it may yet be suggested

of a President.

errors

indefensible.

of any President's

an isolated

Dean

to use

that can be said

of error.

a "pattern"

the removal

fact

minimum

instruct

of or encouraged

of gove rnmen tal decisions,

irreducible
justify

appear

the best

of five years

did not

of any attempt

would

knew

to the IRS, perhaps
nAtion

that he had giv~n

earlier.

Even
Walters,

and contributors

not

do not
to war ran t

it may be that
but perhaps

the

rule out the possibility

of a locus. poeni tentiae.

[12325]
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II.
HATERGATE CASE

Criminal Lmv Analysis

A.

The June 5, 1972 Grand Jury of the United States District
Court for the Distric t of Co Lumb La voted on February 25,

197 f.., to

name Richard H. Nixon, President of the United States~ as an unindicted
member of the conspiracy to defra~d the United States and to obstruct
justice charged in Count I of the indictment returned by that Grand
Jury on March 1, 1974, in the case of United States v. Hitchell, et al.
Simultaneously "dth the issuance of this indictment, the Grand Jury
filed with the c.ourt a Report and Recommendation requesting that certain evidentiary materials obtained by the Grand Jury in the course of
its investigation of the circumstances surrounding the VJatergate
burglary be fan-larded to the Committee
of Representatives.

011

the Judiciary of the House

On March 26, 1974, by order of Ch.ief Judge John

J. Sirica, the Report and Recommendation and accompanying evidentiary
materials were conveyed to the Committee pursuant to the Grand Jury's
request.
The action of the Grand Jury served to sharpen what had
already become a central question of this lmpeaclunent Inquiry~
11

J)
Gr.

No. 74-110
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Did the )?resident, at any time be tween June 17, 1972
and the present day, become a knowing and intentional
participant in a criminal conspiracy to obstruct
justice in connection with the official investigation
of the Watergate break-in?

Law of Conspiracy:

General

Essentially, a criminal conspiracy is a combination, con-cert, or agreement of two or more individuals for the purpose of committing a criminal act, or to do a Lawf uI act by criminal or un LawfuL
'!:_I
means,
It is generally accepted by the federal courts that circumstantial evidence may be used to establish the existence of a conspiratorial agreement, particularly since such an agreement, by its
very nature, is characteriz~d by secrecy, and therefore rarely is there
direct evidence establishing the existence of a conspiracy.

11

No par=

ticular form of agreement or express assent is required to constitute
a criminal conspiracy under is U. s. C:' § 371, as long as the necessary

PU1:'-

pose of the agreement is the commission of some federal offense, even
though all the elements of the substantive offense are not covered by

II
11

,Pettibone v. U.S., 148 U.S. 197, 203; U.S. v. Perlstein, 126 F.2d
789, certiora~denied,
316 U.S. 678.
Ingram v. U.S., 360 U.S. 672; Blumenthal v. U.S., 332 U.S." 539,
557; Baker v. U.S., 329 F.2d, 786, certiorari denied, 379 U.S.
853; U.S. v. ~~twak, .195 F.2d, 748, 753, affld, 344 U.S. 604;
U.S. v. Nack, 112 F.2d 290.
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!!_/

.Itwell established that a "tacit undarst and Lng " as

the agreem.ent.

demonstrated by a certain course of conduct is sufficient to establish

~/
an agreement.

A conspiracy may be deduced from the conduct of the

§_/
parties.
It is not necessary to prove that a particular defendant was
aware of all the aims of the conspiracy or of the identity of all its
participants.

The

r

equf.sLt;e

ag reernen.t
may

exis t without kno~"ler1!?:.e
on

the part of all the conspirators of all the details of the conspiracy

.

7/

or of the identity of all the co-conspirators.-

To convict one as a

conspirator, however, it is necessary to show that he knew or und er+
stood the essential nature or the purpose of the conspiracy, and that
he intended to violate the criminal statute or commit the substantive

8/
crime which was the object of the conspiracy.-

!!_/

u.s,
924;
772.

~/

Furthermore, the

v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 892, certiorari denied, 401 U.S.
u.s. v. Tuffanelli, 131 F.2d 890, certiorari denied, 318 U.S.

Direct Sales Co. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 703, 714.

§_/
Babb v. U.S., 27 F.2d 80, certiorari denied, 278 U.S. 624.

2/

.S_!

Blumenthal v . U.S., 332 U.S. 539, 557; U.S. v. Proj ansky , 465 F.2d
123, 135, certiorari denied, 409 U. S. 1006; U~. v , Agueci, 310
f.2d 817, 826, certiorari denied, 372 U.S. 959.
'
U.S. v. Cardi, 478 F.2d 1362; Miller v. U.S., 382 F.2d 533,
Certiorar:id~nied, 390 U.S. 984; U.s. v.Sneiner, 273 F. Supp .
977, aff'c! LflOF:2d 337, certiorartdcnied,
396 U.S. 825; U.S.
v. Gisenhaltz, 278 F. Supp. 434.
.
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requisite criminal. intent must be at least of the degree of criminal
intent which would be necessary to sustain a conviction for the sub":"'

2/
stantive offense itself.

It has been held that a critical inquiry

in any conspiracy case involves a determination of the kind of agreement or understanding that existed as to each defendant as he understood
}!}_/
it.
It should be noted that 18 U.S.C. §371, relating to conspiracies to lldefraud the United Statesi' or any agency thereof, in any
manner or for any purpose, is not confined to fraud as that term had
been used in the common 1aw , and it reaches any conspiracy for the
purpose of impairing, obstructing, or defeating any lawful governmental
11/

function by. deceit, craft or trickery, or by
Neither

pecuniary

me an s

which are dishonest.

loss to the United States nor receipt of considera-

tion is essential to a finding of a violation of Section 371 relating

~./
to conspiracy to defraud the United States.
The conspiratorial agreement is a crime in itself under 18
U,S.C. §371, independent of the cOlumission of the particular offense

2/

Ingram v. U.S., 360 U.S. 672; Carter v. U.S., 333 :F.2d 354.

10/
U.S. v. Cirillo, 468 :F.2d 1233, certiorari denie~, 410 U.S. 989.

,
Dennis v. U.S., 384 U.S. 855; U.S. v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169;
U.S. v. Sw;rg, 316 F~ Supp. 1148~
U.S. v. Pclg,

433 F. 2d 48, certiorari denied, 401 U. S. 955.
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wh i.ch is the object of the conspiracy.
of conspiracy

is the agreement,

Since the gravamen

the substantive

of the crime

crime itself need not

)2/
However,

be effectuated.

Section

the object of the conspiracyll.
must be followed

371 requires

an "act to effect

Thus, the unlawful

plan or agreement

by at least one overt act or some conduct

in further-

ance of the plan or agreement, before there can be a maturation of the
14/
The overt qct need not be a criminal act; it
crime of conspiracy.
may be an act of preparation,

and it need be done by only one of the

l,}j
conspirators.
As the foregoing
criminal

conspiracy

discussion

indicates,

the elements

of a

include:

1) a. cr tmf.nal obj ective to be accomplished,
objective to be accomplished by criminal

or a lawful
means;

2) some form of an agreement or understanding between
two or more individuals whe reby they become definitely
com mf.t
.. t ed to cooperate for the attainment of the
objective pursuant to an express or implied plan or
scheme embodying the means for its attainment (or
by any effective means);
3) knowledge or understanding by participating
conspirators of the nature or purpose of the conspiracy and
a criminal intent to violate the criminal statute or
commit the substantive offense which is the object of
the conspiracy; and

J:lj

Ca

Llanan v , p.S.,

6L!O,

14/

364 U.S. 587, 593; Pinl:erton v. U.S., 328 U.S.

!1L~3.

'

u.s.

v. Skillman, 442 F.2d 542, 547, certiorari
833; Cro~s v. U.S., 392 F.2d 360.

15/
.,...,....

Braverman

denied,

404 U.S.

v. U.S., 317 U.S. 49, 53.
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4)

an overt act in furtherance of the objective of the
conspiracy. 1j_/

Once a conspiracy becomes "comp Le t e" with the commission of
the first overt act, in the sense that the word is ordinarily used to
represent the establishment of a conspiracy, it continues in existence
until the final objective of the conspiracy is accomplished or until

1:7/
there is shown some affirmative act of abandonment or tennination.

Joining an Ongoing Conspiracx
One need not be a member of a conspiracy fr-om its inception,
18/
Those who join
but can join a continuing conspiracy at any time.
a conspiracy during its progress and cooperate in the COlWlon effort to
obtain the unlawful results become parties thereto and.assume responsi.,..
bi1ity for all preceding acts in furtherance of the scheme , as we Ll,as
19/
As in the case of an original cons:piracy~ it is
subsequent acts,
not essential that the individual joining an existing conspiracy have

M_/

Pinkerton v. ~~.,
145 F.2d 252; ~.
v. Bostic, 480 F.2d
965; U. S. v. Guterma, 189 F. Supp. 265.

III u.

S. v. Perlstein, 126 F.2d 789, certiorari denied, 316 U. S.
678; Nyguist v. y~~.,
2 F.2d 504, certiorari~~ied,
267 ~. S.
606.

~/

Phe~

u. s.

v. ~.,
160 F.2d 858; certiorari denied, 396 U. S. 1060;
v. Lester, 282 F.2d 750; U. S. v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316.

19/
Lefco v. ~.,

74 F.2d 66.
[12332]
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knowledge of all the details of the conspiracy, nor even of the identity
'l!))
of all his co~conspirators.· ,

~wledge

and Intent
CrIm.inaL conspiracy involves more than a general ~~~:
211

a showing of specific intent is required.

Mere association with the

221

conspirators is not enough.-,

Nor is mere knowledge of the criminal

aspects of the enterprise sufficient, even though knowledge must be

?}_I
shown.
In addition to proof of actual knowledge, there must be a
24 1
showdrig of an "Lnt ent; to participate. nTo establish membership in
an ongoing conspiracy, it must be demonstrated

(either thr:ough direct

or circumstantial evidence) that the individual had knowledge of the
conspiracy, and in some fashion contributed his efforts, participated
in an act in furtherance of the conspiracy, or otherwise manifested his

~I

u.s. v. Bolin, 423 F.2d 834; U.S. v. Thomas, 468 F.2d 442, certiorari
'-denied, 410 U.S. 935; U.S. v.CiJdni, 427 F.2d 129, certiorari
~~,
400 U.S. 911.

21;
1!,?YHQodv. U.S., 232 F.2d 220,225, certiorari denied, 351 U.S.
982 (1956); U.S. v. ~ack, 112 F.2d 290, 292 (1940).

2_3:_1
U.S, v , Stro~~~~, 268 F.2d 256 (1959); Dennis v. U.S., 302 F.2d
512 (1962); u.s. v. Steele, 469, F.2d 165,168- (1972).
'

2}_1
Thon~

v , U.S., 57 F.2d 1039,1042

(1932).

24 1

-.

U,S. v.Avi1es, 274 F.2d 179, 189 (1959), certiorari deniei, 362
U.S. 974(i960).
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22)
his intent to participate.·

The defendant must in some sense promote

2.£_/
the venture himself1 make it his own, have a stake in the outcome.
There must be some affirmative action, but a single act may be sufficient

')Lj
to dra\Van individual within the ambit of conspiracy.
In order to determine the President's criminal liab:Uity
according to the law of conspiracy, as of any given moment th time~
the Committee must determine whether the President has I by any affirmative action, including words, manifested an intent to associate himself
with others in an enterprise whose criminal purpose is known to him.

Duty to Act
There is a line of cases suggesting that one who has an
official duty to act to prevent the achievement of the aims of a criminal
conspiracy may be liable as a co-conspirator if he learns of the

25/
Nassif v. U.S., 370 F.2d 147, 152 (1966).

2J!
'--'U,.S. v , Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, aff'd, 311 U.S. 205 (1940). This
"s t ake in the ou t come " or "st ake in the vent ure" test applied in
Falcone has been utilized by some courts to establish the requisite specific intent. The test has been particularly popular with
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. However, it has not won.
universal acceptance. See: Direct Sales Co. v. United States,
supra; United States v. Tl_."_~.21:aglino,
19-7F.2d 928,-9"30 (1952);
Johns v. United States, 195 F.2d 77,79-80 (1952): 72 Harv. L. Rev.
920, 931 (1959).
27(

U.S. v. Carminati, 247 F.2d 6LI01
(1957); U.S. v , Aviles, supra.

certiorari denied, 355 U.S. 883
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!:!if
conspiracy but fails to act to

t hwar t

it.

In each of these cases,

the criminal liability of a law enforcement officer was at issue; in
Jezewski (see fn. 28), the conviction of a mayor was also upheld.
It is important to note, however, that even under the
Burkhardt analysis (see fn. 28), the intent to participate must be
proved.

The officer ,,1111not be held criminally liable for his own

inaction unless it is proved that his failure to act did not stem from
mere indecision or from some innocent motive but was intended by him
to be his contribution to the success of the conspiracy.
Based partly on the Burkhardt principle, the Model Penal
Code of the American Law Institute includes a provision for criminal
liability predicated upon failure to perform a legal duty to prevent
crime:

. • • (3) A person is an accomplice of another person
in the commission of an offense if:
(a) with the purpose of promoting or
facilitating the commission of the offense~
he ..•

(iii) having a legal duty to prevent
the commission of the offense, fails
to make proper effort t~ do so .. ~ •
(Section 2.06 (3) (a) (iii) of the Model Penal Code (1962).)
~.

.28/
U.S. v. Burkhardt, 13 F.2d 8U (6th Cir. 1926); Jezevski V. U.S.,
13 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1926); Lutheran v. JI.JL.., 93 F.2d 395, /100
(8th Cir., 1937), cert denied, 303 U.S. 644, reh. denied, 303 U.S.
668.
----[12335]
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Obstruction

of Justice

Statutes

Title 18, U,S. Code~

a.

11503 provides:

Influencing or lnluring
witness generally.

officer,

juror or

~VllOevercorruptly, or by threats of force, or
.by any threatening letter or communication,
end~avors
to influence, intimidate, or impede any w Lt.ness , in
any court of the United States or before any United
States magistrate or other committing magistrate, or
any grand or petit jury, or officer in or of any, court
of the United States, or officer who may be serving
at any examination or other proceedinE before any
United States magistrate or other committing magistrate,
in the discharge of his duty, or injures any part or
witness in his person or' property, on account of his
attending or having attended such court or examination
before such officer, magistrate, or other committing
magistrate or on account of his testifying or having
testified to any patter pending therein, or injures
any such grand or petit juror in his person or property
on account of any cerdict or indictment assented to
by him, or on account of his being or having been such
juror, or injures any such officer, magistrate, or
other commf.tt Lng magistrate in his person or property
on account of the performance of his official duties,
or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication
influences, obstructs,
or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or
impede, the due administration
of justice, shall be
fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.

b.

Title

18, U.S. Code,

§1505, provides:

Obstruction of proceedings
agencies, and conunittees.

be!ore

departments,

7,.

,

'

vmoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by
any threatening letter or conrrnunication, endeavors t~
influence, intimidate, or impede any witness in any proceeding pending before any department or agency of the
United States, or in connection with any inquiry or
investigation being had by either House, or any committee of either House, or any joint comnu t t ee of the
Congress; or
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Whoever inj ures any party or w.i t ne ss in his
person or property on account of his attendirig or
having attended such proceedingl
inquiry, or investigation, or on account of his testifying or having
testified to any matter pending therein; or

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or
by any threatening letter or conununication influences,
obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, .
obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration
of the law under wh i.ch such proceeding is being had
before such department or agency of the United States,
or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry
under which such inquiry or investigation is being had
by either House, or any conunittee of either House or
any joint committe.e of the Congress -Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.

c.

~it1e 18, U.S. Code,
Obstruction

§1510, provides:

of criminal

investigations.

(a) v,Thoeverwillfully endeavors by means of bribery ~
misrepresentation,
intimidation, or force or threats
thereof to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information relating to a violation of any
criminal statute of the United States by any person
to a criminal investigator; or

Whoever injures any person in his person or
property on account of the glvlng by such person or
by any other person of any such information to any
criminal investigator ~
Shall be fined not more than $5,000, or
imprisoned not more than five yea.rs, or both.
(b) As used in this section, the term "cr Lmf.naL
investigator" me an s any individual duly authorized
by a department, agency, or armed force of the United
States to conduct or engage in investigation of or
prosecutions for violations of the criminal laws of
the United States.
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Discussion
Guided by the general
above, one must review

principles

the evidence

sensitivity

to any showing

or disprove

Presidential

of conspiracy

in the Watergate

area with special

of facts or circumstances

knowledge

law outlined

tending

of the conspiracy

to prove

or intent to join

it.
The President's

wo rds , as we'll as his other actions,

step of the way from June 17, 1972 l1ntil the present
to determine
about

whether

critical

they manifest

a party to an ongoing

break-in,

his criminal

attach.
which
joined

Similarly,
involvement,
involvement
and passive)

conspiracy

suspicion

or ignorance

liability

a Member's

therefore

of Presidential

offenses

of the duration

or mitigatio~

culpability.

immediately
(if any) at

that the President

be pertinent

if any, could be thought pertinent
was early and active)

§37l would

after the point

conclude

for substantive

perception

if the President

at any time after the Watergate

of events occurring

would

speaking,

under 18 U.S.C.

of the Couunittee might

the conspiracy,

of additional

that, strictly

liability

Any discussion

a Hember

day must be scrutinized

facts.

It should be noted
became

his knowledge,

at each

had

to the establishment

committed

after his entry.

and nature
either

of the President's

in aggravation

(if the involvement

(if the

was later

As is often true in ordinary
\.

criminal
whether
question

cases, some facts and dates may be thought not only probative
the President

joined

the conspiracy

whe t he r it is appropriate

at all, but also relevant

for the Congress

to impose

of
to the

in this case
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the sole sanction
There
intended

available

to it, namely,

follows, accordingly,

to offer, for purposes

President's
conspiracy

in principle,

prepared

of analysis

many of the President's

only, an explanation

The hypothesis

of activity

close aides and associates

him from, as well as to conceal

from the American

facts regarding

of themselves

and execution
Committee

of the burglary

headquarters

of the

from the theory of criminal

staff.

that is, a pattern

the involvement

of the evidence,

if not in terms, in the Summary of

by the Majority

of an upward cover-up,

from office.

a general overview

words and actions which differs
adopted

Information

removal

and bugging.of

and other activities

is that

on the part of

designed
people,

to shield

the true

and others in the planning
the Democratic

which

National

the conspirators

desired to keep secret.
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